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A TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF
SCANDAL: FROM MICHAEL MILKEN
TO ENRON TO GOLDMAN SACHS
WILLIAM W. BRATTON*
ADAM J. LEVITIN†

ABSTRACT
Three scandals have reshaped business regulation over the past thirty
years: the securities fraud prosecution of Michael Milken in 1988, the
Enron implosion of 2001, and the Goldman Sachs “ABACUS” enforcement
action of 2010. The scandals have always been seen as unrelated. This
Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional affinity tying these
scandals together—a deal structure known as the synthetic collateralized
debt obligation involving the use of a special purpose entity (“SPE”). The
SPE is a new and widely used form of corporate alter ego designed to
undertake transactions for its creator’s accounting and regulatory benefit.
The SPE remains mysterious and poorly understood despite its use in
framing transactions involving trillions of dollars and its prominence in
foundational scandals. The traditional corporate alter ego was a
subsidiary or affiliate with equity control. The SPE eschews equity control
in favor of control through preset instructions emanating from
transactional documents. In theory, these instructions are complete or very
close thereto, making SPEs a real-world manifestation of the “nexus of
* Deputy Dean and Nicholas F. Gallicchio Professor of Law; Co-Director, Institute for Law &
Economics, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
† Bruce W. Nichols Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center. Our thanks go to William Birdthistle, Erik Gerding, Mike Knoll,
Reed Shuldiner, Lynn Stout, Andrew Tuch, Charles Whitehead, and Chuck Yablon, and to participants
at faculty workshops at the Cardozo, Cornell, Georgetown, and University of Pennsylvania law schools,
and at the University of Miami Business Law Review Symposium.
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contracts” firm of economic and legal theory. In practice, however, formal
designations of separateness do not always stand up under the strain of
economic reality.
When coupled with financial disaster, the use of an SPE alter ego can
turn even a minor compliance problem into a scandal because of the
mismatch between the traditional legal model of the firm and the SPE’s
economic reality. The standard legal model looks to equity ownership to
determine the boundaries of the firm: equity is inside the firm, while
contract is outside. Regulatory regimes make inter-firm connections by
tracking equity ownership. SPEs escape regulation by funneling inter-firm
connections through contracts, rather than equity ownership.
The integration of SPEs into regulatory systems requires a ground-up
rethinking of traditional legal models of the firm. A theory is emerging, not
from corporate law or financial economics, but from accounting principles.
Accounting has responded to these scandals by abandoning the equity
touchstone in favor of an analysis in which contractual allocations of risk,
reward, and control operate as functional equivalents of equity
ownership—an approach that redraws the boundaries of the firm.
Unfortunately, corporate and securities law hold out no prospects for
similar responsiveness. Accordingly, we await the next alter-ego-based
innovation from Wall Street’s transaction engineers with an incomplete
menu of defensive responses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Three scandals fundamentally reshaped the structure of business
regulation over the past thirty years. First came the 1988 securities fraud
prosecution of Michael Milken and his firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert,1
which generated the junk bonds that financed the takeover wars of the
1980s.2 The prosecution marked the end of the takeover wars,3 but not
before Milken’s junk bonds had poisoned the balance sheets of many
savings and loans, leading to their failures.4 The takeover wars reshaped
Delaware corporate law,5 while the savings and loan debacle resulted in
1. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 461, 478–510 (1992) (providing the details of the
prosecutions of Drexel, Milken, and others).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. ROBERT B. THOMPSON, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: LAW AND FINANCE 235 (2010)
(detailing how the prosecution of Milken may have prevented the appeal to the Delaware Supreme
Court of City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), in which the
Delaware Chancery Court had ordered a poison pill withdrawn).
4. BENJAMIN J. STEIN, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE UNTOLD STORY OF MICHAEL MILKEN AND
THE CONSPIRACY TO BILK THE NATION 1–2 (1992).
5. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(requiring directors to maximize short-term value once they have decided to dismantle a company);
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major banking law reforms, culminating in the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 19896 and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.7
The second scandal was Enron’s accounting and securities fraud in
2001, which quickly led to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(“SOX”).8 More recently, the securities fraud scandal surrounding
Goldman Sachs (“Goldman”) and its ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction
provided needed momentum to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.9
Each of these scandals provided an impetus for major changes in
business regulation, but the scandals have always been seen as unrelated.
This Article highlights a previously unnoticed transactional tie that binds
the Milken, Enron, and Goldman affairs—a transaction structure known as
the synthetic collateralized debt obligation developed at J.P. Morgan &
Co., Inc., (“Morgan”) in 1997 under the name “Broad Index Secured Trust
Offering” or “Bistro.”10
Bistro built on the regular or cash collateralized debt obligation
(“CDO”), a security produced through a transaction structure invented by
Milken in 1987.11 The CDO applied the techniques of private-label
mortgage securitization, in its infancy during the 1980s, to corporate bonds
and loans. Bistro combined the CDO with a second financial invention, the
credit default swap (“CDS”), a derivative that Morgan had pioneered
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 448 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (requiring directors to make decisions related to
takeovers based on an informed understanding of the “intrinsic” value of the corporation, rather than the
market value); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (accepting the
appropriateness of takeover defenses and changing the standard for evaluating directors’ response to
unsolicited takeover bids from a business judgment rule to a more demanding, objective “reasonable in
relation to the threat posed” test); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985)
(permitting Delaware boards to adopt a poison pill, which would be evaluated under the Unocal
standard rather than the business judgment rule). Although the takeover era ended badly, it is credited
for the emergence of corporate governance as we now know it. See William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 677–81 (2010)
(describing the prevalence of shareholder-oriented economic assumptions after the takeover era).
6. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183.
7. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105
Stat. 2236.
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. The term CDO refers both to securities and to the entity that issues the securities.
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during the early 1990s.12 The result was a “synthetic” CDO, which
amounted to a securitization of a CDS. Goldman’s ABACUS deal was also
a synthetic CDO, a direct descendant of Bistro. The transactions that lay at
the core of the Enron scandal also descended from Bistro, albeit along a
crooked, collateral line with transactional affinities to Milken-era
machinations.
Our transactional lens highlights commonalities between the scandals
that have significant implications for understanding firms, markets, and risk
taking. All three cases involved compliance problems, bad bets, and
copious red ink. All three scandals involved companies in the vanguard of
financial innovation, populated with swaggering, sharp-elbowed traders.
All three involved companies that loomed large in the public eye as
exemplars of free market capitalism. All three involved transaction
structures designed to facilitate risk management, but which also opened
doors to new modes of market speculation. All three involved the creation
of markets where none had formerly existed—markets that were supposed
to import pricing accuracy and management discipline, but often failed to
do so.
All three also involved misuse of special purpose entities (“SPEs”).13
SPEs are legally distinct entities that companies use to facilitate
transactions that yield regulatory and accounting benefits. In particular,
SPEs enable companies to become “asset light,” meaning that they move
assets and liabilities off their balance sheets without necessarily making a
concomitant sacrifice of earnings power. Becoming “asset light” enhances
return on assets and shareholder value by arbitraging accounting rules and,
in the case of banks and insurers, regulatory capital requirements. The
transactions, however, can lack ancillary business motivations and fall well
short of the arm’s-length transactional ideal. Therefore, when SPE
structures produce red ink, scandal can quickly arise.
The SPEs embody these scandals’ lessons for lawyers and
regulators.14 It is often said that corporations are “artificial entities.”15 With
12. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN
WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 46–56 (2009)
(describing the creation of Bistro and CDS and Morgan’s combined use of the two).
13. SPEs are also known as “special purpose vehicles” or “SPVs.”
14. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1182–83, 1238–39
(2005) (describing Enron’s relationship with outside entities including Nahanni and CHEWCO).
15. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819) (“A corporation is
an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”); Samuel J. Alito,
Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27, 30 (1986)
(referring to “artificial entities, such as corporations”); Ralph Nader, Legislating Corporate Ethics, 30 J.
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conventional corporations, the artifice contains assets, agents, and equity
owners, all of which coalesce together as an interest that can negotiate an
arm’s-length contract. Corporations are also said to be nexuses of
contracts.16 The characterization is apt, but only with a qualification. With
conventional operating companies, the contracts are incomplete, and the
omitted terms are filled in over time by agents operating subject to
governance constraints. Control is critical at this point, and the traditional
legal model allocates it to the holders of the residual economic, or “equity,”
interest.
SPEs, like corporations, begin with artificial legal form. But they
never fully coalesce as independent organizations that take actions in
pursuit of business goals. Nor does control lie with the holder of the equity
interest. Instead, SPEs operate pursuant to instructions emanating from
complex transactional documents. In theory, the instructions are complete
or very close thereto—set in advance in immutable contractual stone. The
SPE is intended to be the firm robotic.
In practice, however, opportunities arise for the exercise of influence
by the transactions’ real parties in interest. When financial disaster follows
such a moment of influence, scandal is invited. Meanwhile, a critical
regulatory question is posed: Should the real parties in interest be treated as
if they are traditional equity holders even though their ties to the SPE are
entirely in contractual form?
The transactional affinities among these scandals point to a new legal
model of the firm, one based not on equity ownership, but on functional
control. In traditional corporate law and financial economics models of the
firm, everything follows from a line of separation between the equity
interest and the interests of contract counterparties. In the traditional model,
equity “owns” the firm, which in turn makes contracts with third parties:
equity is inside the firm, contract is outside, and regulatory regimes make
inter-firm connections by tracking equity ownership.
The SPE scandals all involved the use of third-party contracts, rather
than equity, to exercise control, thereby escaping traditional equity-based
regulation. The SPE scandals show that control can be exercised by
contract as well as by ownership, a transactional development that
LEGIS. 193, 202 (2004) (explaining that “[corporations] are artificial entities”); John C. Coates IV,
Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV.
806, 810–15 (1989) (discussing the artificial entity theory of the corporation).
16. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976).
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accounting principles have begun to recognize, but neither law nor finance.
The new accounting approach rejects the formalism that enabled
transactional arbitrage via SPEs, drawing the line between the firm’s
insiders and outsiders on a case-by-case basis based on allocations of risk
and directive power. This functional conception of the firm may also point
to expanded liability: traditional fiduciary duties may apply to contractual
relationships in addition to equity relations, as Goldman learned with
ABACUS.
This Article tells a five-part story of the development of SPEs and the
related scandals that point to a more refined, functional model of the firm.
Figure 1 presents the genealogy of these scandals.
FIGURE 1. The Genealogy of Scandal

The story begins in Part II with the origins of the collateralized debt
obligation (“CDO”), the brainchild of Michael Milken. The CDO was a
new type of security issued by SPEs that purchased junk bonds from
Milken clients, thereby cleaning up the clients’ balance sheets. The CDO
never realized its potential under Milken; he was convicted of securities
fraud before it could take off. But even from its first days, the CDO
transaction structure was a vehicle for regulatory arbitrage, entwined in the
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failure of one of the nation’s largest life insurers—and the world’s largest
investor in junk bonds—First Executive Corporation. First Executive tried
to use a CDO transaction to get regulatory capital relief for its plunging
junk bond portfolio. It failed.
In Part III we show how Morgan succeeded where First Executive did
not. In a breathtaking regulatory arbitrage, Morgan combined the CDO
with the credit default swap to bring forth Bistro. Bistro posed a question:
Is a swap with an alter ego SPE truly a swap? That is, is there any
economic substance to a party’s contract with itself?
Amazingly, Morgan got a “yes” answer from the Federal Reserve
Board—a “yes” based on the Bistro SPE’s financial contents. The
structure, unlike the one pioneered by First Executive, involved third-party
investors, whose capital commitment was deemed to make the SPE
financially viable. The Bistro structure also magnified the SPE’s capital
base, permitting Morgan to remove billions of dollars of loans from its
regulatory balance sheet by hedging them with swaps with the SPE. These
hedges allowed Morgan to reduce significantly the amount of regulatory
capital it was required to hold, effecting an “asset light” increase in its
return on invested capital.
Bistro was a moment of genius, but there was also something
diabolical about it. Part IV pursues the diabolical possibilities, following
Bistro to Enron, where the Smartest Guys in the Room invented an SPE
and swap variant that protected its earnings statement from $1 billion of
investment portfolio losses. The Enron variation missed Bistro’s central
point, however. Where Morgan infused its SPE with financial wherewithal
in the form of hard money from outside investors, Enron funded its SPEs
with its own common stock. The stock lost value, causing Enron’s selfconstructed swap counterparties to become insolvent and forcing a massive
downward restatement of Enron’s earnings reports. Enron filed for
bankruptcy within two months. Enron had propped up its earnings by
booking revenue from swaps with itself, subverting capitalism’s most basic
norm—it takes two to transact. Scandal followed.
Part V takes a regulatory digression, following Enron rather than
Bistro to the Structured Investment Vehicles (“SIVs”) sponsored by the big
banks in the run up to the financial crisis of 2008. The banks used the SIVs
to follow a different transactional trail blazed by Enron. Enron used SPEs
not only to engage in faux swaps to bolster earnings, but also as off-balance
sheet dumping grounds for underperforming assets and associated
indebtedness. The arrangements were conditional—Enron was back on the

2013]

TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL

791

hook if its stock price fell below stated levels. It received its final kick into
bankruptcy when those off-balance-sheet obligations came due.
The Enron scandal resulted in revised accounting principles. After
Enron, contractual ties to the sponsoring company could prevent the use of
leveraged SPEs to move assets off of balance sheets.17 But the banks
constructed the SIVs to fly in under the radar of the new principles and
used the SIVs to expand their portfolios of securitized subprime mortgage
debt, parking the assets off-balance sheet and funding them with
borrowing.
The off-balance-sheet treatment allowed the banks to increase return
on equity without increasing their assets and debt and, hence, their
regulatory capital. But, as with Enron, there turned out to be a catch. When
the quality of the SIVs’ investments deteriorated in 2007, the banks
honored “implicit” guaranties and brought the SIVs’ assets and debt back
to their own balance sheets. But there was no scandal, for, unlike Enron,
the banks internalized the losses and appeared to have followed the rules. A
regulatory Enron repeat did occur, however. Once again, accounting
standards were revised after the fact in 2010 to prohibit the off-balancesheet treatment employed. With this revision, the accountants provide us
with the basis for a new model of the firm tailored to the SPE, an approach
that abandons the traditional distinction between contract and equity
participations and looks for control where the parties vest it, ignoring the
form their arrangements take.
The SIVs proved to be the canary in the coal mine. The banks would
follow the SIVs into collapse in 2008, along with the rest of the economy.
They would honor their obligations then too, but in many cases only with
federal bailout money. In the end, the risks the banks ran as the SIVs took
advantage of off-balance-sheet treatment were externalized on the economy
as a whole. The fact that the SIVs collapsed without a scandal should now
give us pause.
In Part VI, the story returns to Bistro, the synthetic CDO, and its role
in the Goldman affair. After 2000, Bistro became the template for a
“naked” synthetic securitization—a securitization of a credit default swap
that made a naked bet rather than a hedge. Such naked synthetic CDOs
became a favorite vehicle for betting on the performance of U.S.
mortgages, and as such, facilitated a magnification of risk taking far
beyond direct investments in mortgages and mortgage-backed securities.
17.

See infra text accompanying notes 208–14.
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The new template changed the economic profile of the Bistro structure.
Bistro was a transaction used to obtain regulatory capital relief from a
portfolio of loans owned by a bank. Banks like Goldman repurposed the
structure to enable a party (the “short”) to make a naked wager against the
SPE (the “long”) about the performance of a portfolio of obligations in
which neither party had any credit exposure.
Goldman’s ABACUS 2007-AC1 SPE was one of many such synthetic
CDOs. Like ABACUS, many of them ended up in default. ABACUS
attracted attention because Goldman led the buyers of the CDOs' debt
securities to believe that an actor who helped select the assets for the bet
was also making a long bet when the actor was in fact going short.
Goldman, in other words, marketed assets selected by a party betting that
the assets would decline in value without disclosing the nature and extent
of that party’s participation.18 Not that Goldman lacked a defense: the
deal’s structure presupposed a short and a long and their mutual agreement
on the assets for the wager.19 Even so, Goldman soon cut its losses and
settled with the SEC for $550 million, then the largest settlement in the
agency’s history.20
Part of Goldman’s problem lay in the toxic characterization applied to
bankers and bailouts after 2008. ABACUS was a small-scale compliance
problem that underwent magnification in a particular political context.21 It
all might have gone unnoticed at another time, but in 2010 the economy
was still recovering from externalities inflicted by large financial
institutions. Goldman had the least attractive public profile in the group. It
18. Consent of Defendant Goldman, Sachs & Co. ¶ 3, SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 790 F.
Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 10-CV-3229(BSJ)), 2010 WL 2779309.
19. Goldman mooted a two-part defense: (1) any omission was immaterial, and (2) no actor at
Goldman acted with scienter. Submission on Behalf of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 4–6, In re ABACUS
CDO, No. HO-10911 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2010/04/
Goldman-defence-doc-Part-I.pdf.
20. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/
2010-123.htm.
21. As such, it bears comparison to the 1970s foreign payments scandal. The payments in
question there were bribes made to corrupt actors abroad to facilitate the sale of big-ticket products.
They were termed “questionable” because they were not exactly illegal and had been in pursuit of
profits for American shareholders. But the payments were not exactly appropriate either. The
companies covered them up only to see them uncovered in the course of the Watergate investigation.
The public, reeling from revelations of government corruption, found corporate corruption unacceptable
as well, even corruption abroad in pursuit of shareholder value at home. DONALD R. CRUVER,
COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 5 (2d ed. 1999); GEORGE C. GREANIAS &
DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 59 (1982).
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was the arrogant “Vampire Squid”22 that contributed to the financial
meltdown by promoting risky transactions, even as its CEO proclaimed that
Goldman was “doing God’s work.”23 It thereafter benefitted from federal
bailouts of contract counterparties24 and promptly returned to rapacious
profit making as if nothing had happened.25 ABACUS thus loomed large
because it fed public demands for rectitude on the part of powerful
corporate actors in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008.26 In such
circumstances, even borderline fraud more than sufficed to bring the wrath
of the enforcers, the politicians, and the press.
We think Goldman’s problem also stemmed from the nature of the
securities offered by the ABACUS SPE. A formal entity such as an SPE
that lacks both assets and actors can neither make investments nor
representations about itself, for there is “no there there.”27 It follows that
the eyes of the world turn to the entity’s promoter when things go wrong,
transforming the promoter into the de facto issuer of the securities as well
as their marketer. As such, what ordinarily might be viewed as an arm’slength relationship takes on a fiduciary coloration and invites the
imposition of heightened disclosure duties. Unfortunately, our
characterization better explains the scandal than it maps onto federal
securities law, which is increasingly respectful of formal entities. The
Goldman scandal accordingly heralds no change on the law of SPEs.
Part VII concludes, focusing on the SPE, the central character in each
phase of our story, and how it presents a challenge to traditional equitybased models of the firm. The SPE is a new form of corporate alter ego that
breaks the historical mold by posing as a wholly separate, independent
entity for accounting and regulatory purposes. Unsurprisingly, new
questions follow concerning the responsibilities of those who create and
benefit from it. The cases discussed in this Article show that formal
22. Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, ROLLING STONE (July 9, 2009),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-great-american-bubble-machine-20100405.
23. John Arlidge, I’m Doing “God’s Work.” Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, SUNDAY TIMES (Nov. 8,
2009), www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/article189615.ece.
24. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS IMPACT ON
MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY 3–4 (2010), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT56698/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT56698.pdf.
25. See id. at 85 (after the bailout, “AIG’s normal course of business, such as putting up cash
collateral for new or existing contracts (including both CDSs that would eventually be placed into ML3
and CDSs that AIG still covers)” continued).
26. TETT, supra note 12, at 243–49 (discussing the rapid shift in public sentiment toward Morgan
and other major banking institutions).
27. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937). The use of the term “CDO”
to refer to both an issuer and its securities is perhaps indicative of the lack of entity substance.
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designations of separation constructed by transaction engineers—lawyers,
accountants, and investment bankers—do not always stand up under the
strain of economic reality. The accounting and regulatory authorities have
responded in fits and starts. But, now, after a succession of scandals and
financial disasters, a workable approach is emerging, not from Congress,
corporate lawyers, or bank regulators, but from the Financial Accounting
Standards Board, the private body that promulgates generally accepted
accounting principles (“GAAP”). The new GAAP follows from a
functional model that looks to actual control and economic returns, rather
than formal indicia of ownership, to determine firm boundaries and legal
duties.
It is said that bad law results when lawmakers respond to scandals,28
and there is something to the point. But we reach a contrasting conclusion.
SPE usage in recent years vastly outstripped the ability of regulators to
consider systemic implications. Financial institutions possess the political
wherewithal to retard regulatory catch-up even in the wake of catastrophic
losses. So, even when an arguable compliance problem ripens into a fullblown scandal, it does so as a part of a wider political economic process of
adjustment. This metastasis of peccadilloes into major scandals is a natural
consequence of finance capitalism and its cycle of scandal, regulation, and
transactional end-runs on regulation. Those who push the limit in
transaction structuring have only themselves to blame when scandal
ensues. Even so, regulatory catch up in the case of SPEs remains
incomplete, covering appearances through new accounting standards but
not sponsor liability under corporate and securities law.
II. MYTHIC ORIGINS: MICHAEL MILKEN AND JUNK BONDS
Our story begins with Michael Milken, Drexel Burnham Lambert
(“Drexel”), and the drama they acted out with junk bonds during the 1980s.
Our interest lies in a particular Milken transaction structure, the
28. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS 268–69 (2012) (“[F]ederal intervention in corporate governance tends to be ill-conceived” in
part because such laws “tend to be enacted in a climate of political pressure that does not facilitate
careful analysis of costs and benefits.”); Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 88 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012)
(explaining that legislation adopted in response to financial crises is bound to be “off the mark”); Larry
E. Ribstein, Commentary, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 82 (2003) (“[L]awmakers regulating in a
crash are likely to ignore or minimize regulatory costs.”); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528 (2005) (“The healthy
ventilation of issues that occurs in the usual give-and-take negotiations . . . did not occur” when
Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted).
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collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), which only made its appearance in
his drama’s last act. Even so, the CDO stood at the intersection of the era’s
highest profile compliance scandal and the Savings and Loans debacle.
More importantly, we here witness the genesis of central pieces of later
scandals: the securitization of dodgy financial assets; desperate attempts to
clean up corporate balance sheets either for market or regulatory capital
purposes; and companies swapping with themselves.
A. JUNK BONDS AND S&LS
Michael Milken’s contribution to corporate finance was the original
issue, non-investment-grade (“junk”) bond. Before Milken, the bond
market accepted only new issues of investment grade paper. The preMilken junk bond market was comprised only of “fallen angels”—bonds
that had been investment grade at issue but had been subsequently
downgraded.29 Milken argued that junk bonds were irrationally stigmatized
and therefore underpriced by the market; they represented a good value,
particularly as the benefits of portfolio diversification nullified the risk on
individual bonds.30
Milken established a trading operation in junk bonds at Drexel in the
early 1970s and succeeded in marketing new issues of junk bonds in large
amounts by 1977.31 The new market grew rapidly in the 1980s when junk
bonds became the preferred tool for financing (or defending against)
corporate takeovers. Issuers found the junk bond market an attractive
alternative to bank borrowing for mobilizing large sums of capital quickly.
Junk bond buyers sought high yields, relying on misleading reports of low
junk bond default rates in early academic research.32 Here at last was the
29. Robert A. Taggart, Jr., The Growth of the “Junk” Bond Market and Its Role in Financing
Takeovers, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 5, 8 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). See also George A.
Akerlof & Paul M. Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit 45 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. R1869, 1994), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=227162 (observing that the market for subinvestment grade bonds was “trivially small” prior to Milken).
30. These were notably self-serving assertions from one seeking to make a market in junk bonds.
31. Taggart, supra note 29, at 8.
32. The first published research on junk bond default rates was Edward I. Altman & Scott A.
Nammacher, The Default Rate Experience on High-Yield Corporate Debt, 41 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 25, 27–
35 (1985). Altman and Nammacher found a very low default rate on junk bonds, but their measurement
had several flaws. Id. at 29. First, it failed to distinguish between bonds that were junk at issuance and
“fallen angels”—bonds that had been originally investment grade and were subsequently downgraded.
Id. at 30–31. Instead, Altman and Nammacher looked at all high-yield debt. If the fallen angels
performed better than the true-born junk, it would mask the real performance of the junk. Second, it
defined default somewhat formally and narrowly, excluding restructurings where there were payments
in kind of securities instead of cash. See id. at 26 (“The appropriate base for calculating the default rate
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portfolio manager’s holy grail: high return for low risk.
Milken built a network of junk bond issuers and investors, leveraging
Drexel’s trading operation into a secondary junk bond market.33 This
secondary market provided liquidity that added appeal to new junk bond
issues. It was a proprietary operation: sitting at his X-shaped trading desk
in Beverly Hills, Milken matched buyers and sellers, taking fees on every
deal.34 He alone was the node that connected the market’s sell-side issuers,
corporate raiders prominent among them, and buy-side institutional
investors.
A handful35 of high-flying, federally-insured savings and loans figured
for corporate debt seems to us to be the low-rated straight debt market.”). Exchanges were not included
in their definition of default. See Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 51–52 (explaining that such
exchanges “were not taken into account in the junk bond market’s halcyon years”). This had the effect
of reducing the numerator in the default rate.
The greater flaw, however, was that Altman and Nammacher presented the default rate as a
percentage of total debt outstanding: their 1.53 percent annual default rate from 1974–1985 was the
quotient of high-yield debt defaulted in a year over high-yield debt outstanding in a year. EDWARD I.
ALTMAN & SCOTT A. NAMMACHER, INVESTING IN JUNK BONDS: INSIDE THE HIGH YIELD DEBT
MARKET 103–04 (1987). The problem with this approach was that it would necessarily understate the
riskiness of high-yield debt if the market were expanding and conversely overstate it if the market were
contracting. To wit, imagine that over ten years the volume of high-yield debt began at one hundred and
doubled annually. Also assume that there is a 100 percent default rate on all high yield debt, but that the
default does not occur until year five. Thus, in years one through four, the default rate is zero. In year
five, by Altman and Nammacher’s calculation, the default rate is 3.2 percent
(=100/(100+200+400+800+1600)). And by year ten, the default rate is 3.1 percent (=3200/102300). As
it happens, the market was rapidly expanding, so Altman and Nammacher’s methodology understated
the real risk on junk bonds.
Altman’s later work recognized the flaws in this approach, but this recognition came after his
initial work was used to promote the safety of a diversified junk bond portfolio. See Edward I. Altman,
Revisiting the High-Yield Bond Market, 21 FIN. MGMT. 78, 85 (1992) (acknowledging criticisms of the
traditional method for calculating default rates); Edward I. Altman, Measuring Corporate Bond
Mortality and Performance, 44 J. FIN. 909, 912 (1989) (adopting human mortality calculation methods
for calculating investment risks); Paul Asquith, David W. Mullins, Jr. & Eric D. Wolff, Original Issue
High Yield Bonds: Aging Analysis of Defaults, Exchanges and Calls, 44 J. FIN. 923, 924–25 (1989)
(arguing that prior default calculations underestimated actual high-yield bond default rates).
33. Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 46.
34. X Marked the Spot . . ., L.A. TIMES (May 28, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-0528/business/fi-148_1_michael-milken.
35. While by the late 1980s S&Ls as a whole held only around 7 percent of the junk bonds in the
market, Taggart, supra note 29, at 11, this 7 percent was highly concentrated among a handful of S&Ls
closely associated with Milken. Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 53. By 1989, S&Ls held over $13.5
billion in junk bonds or 6.5 percent of a $205 billion market. Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo &
Stuart C. Gilson, The Collapse of First Executive Corporation: Junk Bonds, Adverse Publicity, and the
“Run on the Bank” Phenomenon, 36 J. FIN. ECON. 287, 290 (1994) (market size); Anise C. Wallace,
Savings Units Trim “Junk” Holdings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1990, at D7, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/02/business/savings-units-trim-junk-holdings.html (S&L holding
size). A single S&L, Columbia Savings & Loan Association of Beverly Hills, California, held over
$4.36 billion in junk bonds by 1989, accounting for more than 2 percent of the entire junk bond market.
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prominently on both the buy and the sell sides. For example, Charles
Keating used Drexel junk bonds to finance his takeover of an S&L, Lincoln
Savings & Loan, and then caused Lincoln to figure prominently as a junk
bond customer.36 The implicit rule was pay to play: if you wanted Drexel to
underwrite your junk bonds, it was understood that you would be a buyer
for Drexel’s future issues.37 And the players were willing. Keating was not
the only junk bond investor who took over an S&L in a Drexel-financed
acquisition.38 The S&Ls, with their federally-insured deposit bases,39 in
turn provided ready buyers for new issues.40
It has been alleged, credibly in our view, that the S&Ls took part in a
“daisy chain” scheme masterminded by Milken to inflate junk bond prices
artificially and make the market appear more liquid than it was, enhancing
Richard W. Stevenson, “Junk Bond” Shift Hurts Columbia Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1989, at D19,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/10/26/business/junk-bond-shift-hurts-columbiasavings.html. See also James Bates & Greg Johnson, For Sale: Used S&Ls, Including Lincoln, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1990, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-11-03/business/fi3357_1_drexel-junk-bond (describing the forced sale of several Saving & Loans which invested heavily
in junk bonds, including Lincoln and Imperial).
36. 1 FDIC, MANAGING THE CRISIS: THE FDIC AND RTC EXPERIENCE 282 (1998), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-11.pdf. Keating bought Lincoln Savings &
Loan with the proceeds of a Drexel underwriting. Id. Keating then turned Lincoln into a leading junk
bond purchaser. 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
AGE OF DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 170 (2002). Similarly, in 1983
corporate raider Victor Goulet, already a major junk bond investor, purchased a controlling interest in
the stock of Imperial Corporation of America (ICA), the parent of Imperial Savings and Loan
Association of California. Goulet’s acquisition was funded by Executive Life, a major life insurance
company closely affiliated with Milken, which will be discussed below for its own CDO. Amended
Complaint Class Action at 140, FDIC v. Milken, 781 F. Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. 91-0433)
[hereinafter FDIC Complaint]. Executive Life later acquired a 9.9 percent share in ICA, and Columbia,
another Milken-dominated S&L, purchased an 8 percent share. Id at 143. Later, in 1988, MDC, a
Denver-based homebuilder financed by Milken, purchased 9.5 percent of Imperial’s stock, apparently in
an attempt to prop up its stock price. Stephen P. Pizzo, Congress to Investigate “Daisy Chain” of
Thrifts, NAT’L MORTGAGE. NEWS, Dec. 18, 1989, at 1.
37. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 158; Richard Stengel, Free Mike Milken, SPY, Feb. 1990,
at 45, 48. Milken may also have rewarded cooperative conspirators with insider information on deals to
facilitate insider trading.
38. In some cases, these investors used the banks as personal piggy-banks, looting them. See
WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE: HOW CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
AND POLITICIANS LOOTED THE S&L INDUSTRY 38 (2005) (describing the S&L acquisition process);
KATHLEEN DAY, S&L HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS BEHIND THE $1 TRILLION SAVINGS AND
LOAN SCANDAL 387–90 (1993) (discussing the involvement of numerous top officials in the S&L
scandal).
39. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 140.
40. Dan Morain & James Granelli, Lincoln S&L Backed Boesky Takeover Bids: Irvine-Based
Thrift Invested $100 Million, Apparently Profited, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1989, § 4, at 1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-30/business/fi-1423_1_risky-investments. When it looked like an
issue was headed for default, Milken engineered for its refinancing, thereby maintaining the junk bond
market’s performance record. Stengel, supra note 37, at 49.

798

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:783

its appeal to investors and further encouraging its growth.41 A “daisy
chain” is a Ponzi scheme variant that inflates the value of an asset not
because of any change in fundamentals, but through constant “flipping”: an
asset is sold back and forth among the chain’s members who book “profits”
on each sale even as the fundamental value of the asset does not
appreciate.42
Thus did the handful of Milken-associated S&Ls sell each other junk
bonds at inflated prices set by Milken, using their phony “gains” to mask
their real financial results (and in some cases to disguise looting by their
owners), at least for a while. They also provided a market for Milken to
place more and more junk bonds and take more underwriting fees.
B. THE FIRST COLLATERALIZED BOND OBLIGATIONS
There were implicit limits on the liquidity Milken could gin up at the
X-shaped trading desk. After all, in a daisy chain, each bond seller is also a
bond buyer. Within the chain, the pool of new cash for purchases expands
only to the extent the members expand their businesses or new members
join up (as in a Ponzi scheme). Meanwhile, there were limits on the class of
potential new members. Pension funds, for example, were required to
invest only in investment-grade bonds and so stayed out of the junk market.
Other institutions’ junk bond portfolios were subject to regulatory caps. For
example, federally chartered S&Ls were limited to holding 11 percent of
their assets in junk bonds.43 Thus did Drexel and its S&L clients share a
41. See FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 5–7 (describing the Milken Group’s manipulation of
the junk bond market). Numerous Milken affiliated partnerships were also part of the daisy chain.
Akerlof & Romer, supra note 29, at 47–48. But see DANIEL FISCHEL, PAYBACK: THE CONSPIRACY TO
DESTROY MICHAEL MILKEN AND HIS FINANCIAL REVOLUTION 285 (1995) (“The daisy chain variant of
the high-yield bond market as a Ponzi scheme claim was ludicrous.”). While we think the charge
credible, we note that it would have been extremely hard to prove: given an artificially inflated price,
chain members would have had every incentive to cheat by shorting, much like members of a cartel.
42. Pizzo, supra note 36.
43. The 11 percent figure is never actually stated in federal statutory or regulatory materials, but
was widely understood within the S&L industry. E.g., Taggart, supra note 29, at 18. Prior to 1980,
Federal savings and loans lacked authority to invest in corporate debt securities. The Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 authorized investment in corporate debt
securities, but limited the investment authority for corporate debt securities and consumer loans
together to 20 percent of an S&L’s assets. Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 401, 94 Stat. 132, 153 (1980). This 20
percent cap was removed by the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Pub. L. No. 97320, § 329, 96 Stat. 1469, 1502 (1982) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2) (1982)), and replaced with a
30 percent cap on consumer loans, but no explicit cap on corporate debt securities, which were “as
defined and approved by the [Federal Home Loan Bank] Board. Id. Confusingly, the section heading in
the United States Code was never amended, so it still reads “Loans or investments limited to 20 per
centum of assets,” despite statutory language stating that the limits are set forth in subparagraphs,
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high-powered incentive to innovate. They needed a way to package junk
bonds so as to end-run the regulatory barriers.
A potential packaging template had been invented only recently,
namely securitization. Securitization was first pioneered in the mortgage
market, starting in 1970, but developments in the 1980s made it a much
more sophisticated transaction form. In a mortgage securitization, a bank
takes a bundle of residential mortgages out of its portfolio and sells them to
an SPE that it itself creates.44 The SPE in turn goes to the public securities
including the higher limit for consumer loans.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) implementing regulations stated that
investments in corporate debt securities had to be in securities “rated in one of the four highest grades
by at least two nationally recognized investment rating services at their respective most recent
published rating before the date of purchase of the security,” meaning that the corporate debt securities
had to be investment grade. 12 C.F.R. § 545.75(b)(2) (1984). However, the rule making permitted
S&Ls to invest up to 1 percent of their assets in corporate debt securities irrespective of their rating “if
in the exercise of its prudent business judgment it determines that there is adequate evidence that the
obligor will be able to perform all that it undertakes to perform in connection with such securities,
including all debt service requirements.” Id. § 545.75(d). In other words, on their face, the regulations
permitted up to 1 percent of S&Ls’ assets to be invested in junk bonds if the S&L believed that the
bonds would not default.
In its Federal Register release publishing the regulations, however—but not in the regulation
itself—the FHLBB stated that “the Board wishes to clarify that an investment in notes, paper, or debt
securities may be treated as a commercial loan to the issuer whether or not they satisfy the rating,
marketability, and other requirements of § 545.75.” 48 Fed. Reg. 23032, 23045 (May 23, 1983). This
meant that S&Ls could purchase junk bonds and treat them as “commercial loans” for the purposes of
investment regulation. Accordingly, the applicable limit for S&L junk bond purchases was the 10
percent of assets limit set for commercial loans. 12 C.F.R. § 545.46(a) (1984). This 10 percent limit
could then be added to the 1 percent facially permitted junk bond limit, as S&Ls were permitted to elect
the “classification of loans or investments,” namely that the S&L could choose which limit would apply
to a particular loan or investment if multiple limits could apply. Id. § 545.31. This should not be
confused with regulatory classification of loans for Allowance of Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL)
purposes.
Thus, an S&L could opt for the 10 percent limit plus the 1 percent limit to get up to 11
percent of its assets in junk bonds. See 52 Fed. Reg. 25870, 25876 (July 9, 1987) (referring to the 11
percent limit); Taggart, supra note 29, at 18. This 11 percent limit was somewhat mitigated by the fact
that junk bonds were competing with other financing products for the 11 percent cap—true unsecured
commercial loans, commercial paper, financing leasing, overdraft loans on demand accounts, unsecured
loans made by S&L service corporation subsidiaries, and inventory and floor plan loans to consumer
goods dealers.
44. Here we describe a private-label mortgage securitization, not a securitization guaranteed by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae. The first private-label mortgage-securitization deal is often
dated to 1977, with credit being awarded to a $100 million Bank of America deal issued on September
21, 1977. See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 1343 at *5–7 (May 19, 1977) (describing Bank of America MBS transaction); Michael D.
Grace, Alternative Mortgages and the Secondary Market, AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1982, at 5 (describing
the integration of mortgage and bond markets in the 1970s as well as the Bank of America deal). It
appears that this was in fact the third mortgage securitization, but the first true private pass-through
securitization. The first modern private mortgage bond appears to have been the California Federal
Savings and Loan’s September 25, 1975, a $50 million bond issuance secured by FHA-insured / VA-

800

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:783

markets and sells long-term notes. The SPE uses the cash proceeds of the
sale of its notes to pay the bank the purchase price of the pool of
mortgages. The mortgages in the SPE’s pool secure the notes, generating a
stream of cash that pays the notes’ principal and interest.
Early mortgage securitizations were pass-through certificates,
representing a pro rata claim on the cash flows from the pool of mortgages.
But between 1983 and 1986 mortgage securitizations began to appear that
featured “tranching”—the slicing of cash flows into various unequal strips.
At first, tranching was done solely to ameliorate interest rate risk, but by
1986, tax rules permitted tranching for credit risk as well.45 This meant that
SPEs could issue notes in different series, dividing the claims on the
“waterfall” of cash generated by the mortgages into tranches: junior,
mezzanine, and senior. The juniors bear the first-loss risk on the mortgages
in the pool, the mezzanine holders the next level of risk, and the seniors the
residual risk.
The greater the risk, the higher the interest rate on the notes in the
tranche. Thus, a pool of mortgages bearing an average 7 percent coupon
could be divided into bonds a third of which (seniormost) would have 6
percent coupons, a third (mezzanine) 7 percent coupons, and a third
(juniormost) 8 percent coupons. In practice, most notes in securitizations
are in the senior tranches—as a rule of thumb, 80–90 percent.46 Thus, for a
pool of 7 percent mortgages, we might have 90 percent of the notes be
senior with a coupon of 6.5 percent, 8 percent be mezzanine with a coupon
of 10 percent, and 2 percent be junior with a coupon of 17.5 percent. The
guaranteed mortgages. Mortgage Bonds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 13, 1975, at 86. The second
private-label deal was a $200 million bond issuance by the Home Savings and Loan Association (Los
Angeles, California) on June 23, 1977, secured by conventional mortgages. Grace, supra. The Bank of
America deal was a true pass-through; the prior deals appear to have been secured bonds, meaning that
the revenue to pay the bondholders was not necessarily from the mortgages in the first instance. The
private-label mortgage securitization market remained small until 2004–2008.
45. In early 1986, an Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Ruling enabled securitizers to
retain a credit-enhancing junior tranche of up to 10 percent. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 86-20-014 (Feb. 7,
1986). In October of 1986, the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 860A–G, were enacted. These provisions enabled the sale of junior tranches
as well as senior. See Mark Basch, Salomon Offers Two-Class Mortgage Security; Lending Institution
Retains Subordinate Class of Pass-Through Certificate, AM. BANKER, Feb. 26, 1987, at 3 (discussing
the first use of the senior/subordinated structure for commercial mortgages after the 1986 tax code
changes); Richard Chang, Coast Holds Risk on Commercial MBS, NAT’L MORTGAGE. NEWS, Mar. 9,
1987, at 14 (discussing issue of $53 million of commercial mortgage backed securities whose risks are
“largely held by the originator in a subordinated class”); Jed Horowitz, Salomon Sells Junior Portion of
Remic Security, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1987, at 15 (discussing first Real Estate Mortgage Investment
Conduit (“REMIC”) with junior tranche sold for Residential Funding Corp).
46. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 82
(2011) (noting that many mortgage-backed securities received AAA credit ratings because of tranches).
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average coupon rate is constant, but the distribution among tranches can be
tailored to match investors’ preferences for risk and reward. This sort of
structured security enables issuers to cater to idiosyncrasies in market
demand.
Securitization lets the bank transform illiquid assets (there is no
trading market for individual residential mortgages) into liquid assets
traded on the bond market. But why would the bond market accept debt
securities issued by a shell entity like an SPE? The market looks through
the entity to the value of the assets inside it. So long as the transfer to the
SPE is deemed a “true sale” and the SPE is constructed to be “bankruptcy
remote” from the bank, the market deems the mortgages to be locked into
the SPE.47 In addition, the mortgages in the SPE’s pool are geographically
diverse, and the SPE’s notes are rated by credit rating agencies. Add it up,
and the return on the SPE’s notes is higher than would be obtainable on a
corporate bond with the same rating. The bank emerges free to make new
loans from the principal returned upon the transfer to the SPE, transactions
that generate new fees. Finally, for accounting and bank capital purposes
the mortgages are deemed removed from the bank’s balance sheet. (In
future years, the widespread availability of securitization would stoke the
mortgage markets, leading to a surfeit of subprime lending and ultimately
the financial crisis. But that is not our story.)
The securitization model enhanced liquidity. There was nothing,
however, that limited securitization to mortgages. Other types of assets,
such as junk bonds, could potentially be securitized just like mortgages.
Experimentation proceeded at two intertwined Drexel clients, Imperial
Savings and an insurance company named First Executive Life, which was
also the largest shareholder of Imperial Saving’s parent corporation.48
1. Imperial Savings
Imperial Savings Association, a California S&L run by the former
head of Freddie Mac, joined Drexel to apply the securitization technique to
47. See William McInerney, From Bankruptcy Remote to Risk Remote, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 23, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120247072324 (describing the primary features of bankruptcyremoteness as restricted ability to file for bankruptcy and single purpose). Here, bankruptcy remote
means that the assets of the SPE will not be consolidated with those of the bank in the event the bank is
put into receivership. Bankruptcy remote also has a separate, distinct meaning, namely that the SPE
itself will not or cannot file for bankruptcy.
48. Susan Burkhardt, Partner of Target in SEC Probe Owns Nearly 10% of Imperial, SAN DIEGO
UNION, Sept. 19, 1987, at C1. Other Milken-associated entities also owned large stakes in Imperial.
Susan Burkhardt, Denver Firm Buys 6.9% of ICA Stock, SAN DIEGO UNION, Nov. 6, 1987, at C1.
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junk bonds.49 Imperial was the sixteenth largest S&L in the country when it
was seized by the FDIC on February 23, 1990.50 Between 1986 and 1989,
Imperial purchased more than $1.6 billion in Drexel-underwritten junk
bonds,51 and its $1.5 billion junk bond portfolio52—10 percent of its
assets53—was the second largest of any thrift.54
In 1987, Imperial, together with Drexel as underwriter, issued the first
collateralized debt obligation.55 Imperial transferred $200 million of junk
bonds to an SPE called “Long Run Bond Corp.” The bonds were priced at
99.73 (virtually at par);56 they were diversified by industry; and they
carried ratings greater than or equal to B- or BBB (low investment grade).57
The SPE then issued $100 million in collateralized notes with a three-year
maturity.58 Between the two-to-one overcollateralization59 and the
diversification of the bonds by issuer and industry, Imperial and Drexel
were able to convince Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s to award the CDO
an AAA-rating.60 There does not appear to have been senior-subordinate
tranching for credit support. It seems likely that Imperial retained the
49. The Chairman of the Board of Imperial’s parent, Imperial Corporation of America, was
Victor Goulet, a Milken-financed raider. IMPERIAL CORP. OF AM. ANNUAL REPORTS (1986–1988).
50. Greg Johnson, Imperial S&L's Parent Files for Chapter 11 Thrifts: The Action, Which Was
Expected, Won't Affect Depositors, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1990, at D4, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-01/business/fi-2401_1_imperial-savings.
51. FDIC Complaint, supra note 36, at 169.
52. Bates & Johnson, supra note 35.
53. Susan Burkhardt, Junk-Bond Based Imperial Offering Wins Triple-A Rate, SAN DIEGO
UNION, Sept. 25, 1987, at E1.
54. Bates & Johnson, supra note 35. The largest cache was the more than $4 billion holding of
Columbia Savings and Loan of Beverly Hills, California (located conveniently near the Drexel junk
bond desk). Richard W. Stevenson, California Saving Unit Seized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1990, at 33,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/24/business/california-saving-unit-is-seized.html.
55. Major Debt and Equity Offerings by Financial Companies; In September (Dollar Amounts in
Millions), AM. BANKER, Oct. 13, 1987, at 6. Technically, the collateralized debt obligation was a
collateralized bond obligation or CBO. A CBO would be distinguished from a collateralized loan
obligation or CLO—one contains bonds, the other loans. We are eliding the difference in this paper,
using CDO as a term encompassing both.
56. Press Release, Bus. Wire, Imperial Savings Offers $100 Million in Notes Backed by HighYield Bonds (Sept. 24, 1987).
57. Burkhardt, supra note 53.
58. Major Debt and Equity Offerings by Financial Companies; In September (Dollar Amounts in
Millions), supra note 55.
59. See Leslie Gifford, Drexel Prices First Issue Ever Backed by Corporate Junk Bonds; Prices
Down, BOND BUYER, Sept. 25, 1987, at 5 (noting that Moody’s rating criteria were 165–250 percent
overcollateralization, diversification, marked-to-market collateral monthly, updated every two weeks
for price volatility, market price, and credit rating). Implied in this is that Imperial had an obligation to
top off the collateral pool if its value declined.
60. Richard Chang, Imperial Securities to Be Backed by Junk Bond Collateral, NAT’L
MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 31, 1987, at 10.
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residual equity interest in the SPE.
The effect was to enable institutional investors prohibited from
holding non-investment-grade investments to invest in junk bonds, thereby
expanding the market. The terms of the CDO made them quite attractive—
the bonds were AAA-rated, but with a yield eighty-five basis points above
comparable duration Treasuries.61 A third of the bonds were sold to S&Ls
(presumably including some Milken daisy chain participants), the rest to
pension and investment funds.62
The deal gave Imperial immediate liquidity63—instant cash instead of
bonds that would pay out over years. Presumably, retention of the equity
interest in the SPE precluded off-balance-sheet accounting treatment, but
there was a give back. Retaining the SPE equity meant that Imperial could
benefit from SPE’s overcollateralization and the spread between the high
coupons on the junk bonds and the lower rates on the notes issued by the
SPE,64 as the SPE’s revenue, beyond what was needed to pay the CDO
notes and the CDO trustee, would presumably go back to Imperial.
The possibilities held out by the Imperial CDO were not lost on the
investment banking world. As one observer noted, “Investment bankers
clearly see a gold mine in this product. The total volume of corporate bonds
currently outstanding is about $600 billion, and securitization offers
investors the opportunity to transform their holdings into cash.”65
Even so, Imperial seems to have had second thoughts about the twoto-one ratio of junk bonds to collateralized notes. So when Imperial
packaged a second CDO in late 198866 it more closely followed the
61. Gifford, supra note 59.
62. Burkhardt, supra note 53.
63. We detect no additional or alternative motivation for the Imperial deals. There does not
appear to have been a regulatory capital arbitrage. While federally chartered S&Ls were limited to
holding 11 percent of their assets in junk bonds, see supra text accompanying note 43, Imperial was a
California chartered thrift, and California removed all limits on S&L junk bond investment. PAUL
TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 109, 113 (2004). The Federal Savings & Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC), which insured Imperial, had no restrictions on junk bond investment. See id. at
111–15 (discussing the FSLIC’s permissive regulatory policies).The motivation for the CDOs might
simply have been to enable Imperial to raise funds against its junk bond holdings, rather than against its
overall asset base. We also cannot rule out Milken / Drexel as the driving force in the transaction, as the
creation of the CDOs effectively expanded the market of junk bond purchasers, a development that
benefitted Milken and Drexel.
64. Gifford, supra note 59.
65. Id.
66. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Aug. 8, 1988, at 25
(discussing a planned offering). See also R. RUSSELL HURST, FIRST UNION SECURITIES, INC., CDO
QUARTERLY REVIEW app. A (May 2000), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/cdo_0500.pdf
(listing a $126 million rated portion of a CDO issued by Long Run Bond Corp, with Imperial S&L and
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residential mortgage securitization model, using a senior-subordinate
structure. The second deal featured three tranches. The first (and
presumably largest) was AAA-rated and sold to investors.67 The second
tranche was lower rated and held in portfolio by Imperial’s parent
company.68 The third, unrated tranche was given to a pair of San Diego
charities (following a model developed in other securitizations).69 This
apparently enabled Imperial to get off-balance-sheet treatment for the
CDO70 even as it retained a slice of the risk and return on the junk bonds by
retaining the SPE’s second tranche. Figure 2, below, presents a summary
version of the transaction.
Capwood Christian as managers and Drexel as agent with an issuance date of 11/1/1988). The second
deal seems to have been considerably larger than the first, although we have not been able to identify a
precise figure. See Eric Homer, Phoenix Lights Up Murky World of CDOs, PRIVATE PLACEMENT
LETTER, June 18, 2001, at 1 (noting that the two Imperial deals totaled $606 million).
67. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66. It was insured by Financial Security
Assurance, a monoline bond insurer, which had the ability to veto the sale or purchase of bonds by the
CDO. Telephone Interview with Thomas Saake, Administrator, Long Run Bond Corp., (Aug. 6, 2012).
Mr. Saake worked at Imperial and then at Capwood-Christian, the Long Run Bond Corp.’s manager, in
which Imperial had purchased a controlling stake. According to Mr. Saake, FSA only approved sales of
the bonds in Long Run Bond Corp.’s portfolio, in keeping with its interest as a senior creditor in
liquidating assets. Id. After Imperial’s failure, the Resolution Trust Corp. took over Imperial’s interest
in the mezzanine bonds. Id.
68. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66.
69. Saake Interview, supra note 67.
70. Imperial Offering “Junk Bond” CMO, supra note 66.
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FIGURE 2. The Imperial Savings Association CDO

These Imperial deals did not beget a scandal. Instead, they slightly
inflated the junk bond bubble and in the end were no more than a minor
footnote at the juncture of the Milken / Drexel compliance scandal and the
S&L debacle.71 The third CDO, however, had a closer tie to scandal as part
and parcel of the “largest insurance company failure in U.S. history.”72
2. First Executive
First Executive (“FE”) was a life insurance company run by CEO Fred
Carr, a close personal acquaintance of Milken, and “Milken’s biggest and
71. The FDIC and RTC settled all of their civil claims with Milken, other Drexel executives, and
their insurers for $1.3 billion. Alison Leigh Cowan, F.D.I.C. Backs Deal by Milken, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1992, at D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/10/business/fdic-backs-deal-bymilken.html. This was on top of a $400 million settlement Milken reached with the SEC. Id. It was
followed in April 1990 by a criminal plea by Milken. Kurt Eichenwald, Milken Defends “Junk Bonds”
As He Enters His Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1990, available at
www.nytimes.com/1990/04/25/business/milken-defends-junk-bonds-as-he-enters-his-guilty-plea.html?
pagewanted=all&src=pm. In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, which eliminated S&Ls’ ability to
invest in junk bonds and required divestment of existing holdings over a five-year period.
72. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 288.
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best customer.”73 FE was a “controversial upstart in an otherwise mostly
staid life insurance industry.”74 Under Carr’s management, FE had
experienced dramatic growth,75 famously marketing a new insurance
product, the single-premium deferred annuity.76 This promised a hefty
payment in the future in exchange for a small amount today, a return only
possible because FE in turn earned high returns on a junk bond portfolio.77
Indeed, FE held the largest junk bond portfolio in the world,78 totaling
nearly $11 billion in 1989, when the entire junk bond market’s value was
around $205 billion.79 Carr accorded Milken trading discretion over the
bonds in FE’s account,80 and Milken held an equity stake in FE.81 Milken
exercised his discretion copiously, turning over $40 billion in FE trades
between 1982 and 1987.82
FE was in financial distress by 1988.83 It had an unpleasant choice:
73. FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 284.
74. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 289.
75. Kathy M. Kristof, Behind Executive Life’s Fall: Regulators Are Taking the Heat for Letting
the Insurer’s Problems Go on, Entrapping Thousands of Its Policyholders, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991,
at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-09-01/business/fi-2535_1_executive-life. Its
insurance in force increased from $700 million in 1974 to nearly $60 billion in 1989.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. GARY SCHULTE, THE FALL OF FIRST EXECUTIVE: THE HOUSE THAT FRED CARR BUILT 190
(1991).
79. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 290.
80. See STEIN, supra note 4, at 88–94 (discussing Milken’s influence and power within FE);
STEWART, supra note 1, at 67 (1992) (explaining that Milken would “freely trade” with Carr’s portfolio
without consulting Carr).
81. CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS’ BALL: THE INSIDE STORY OF DREXEL BURNHAM AND THE
RISE OF THE JUNK BOND RAIDERS 276 (1988).
82. SCHULTE, supra note 78, at 190.
83. First Executive started running into trouble in 1986, when New York insurance regulators
forced it to restate its financials by $180 million, leaving it with less than $90 million in equity value.
Kristof, supra note 75. From then on, First Executive bounced from one set back to another until its
final collapse in 1989. By 1987, default rates on junk bonds had gone up and Milken and Drexel were
under investigation in connection with the Ivan Boesky insider trading scandal. Associated Press,
Milken Said to Be Subpoenaed by House Panel, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1988),
http://articles.latimes.com/1988-04-22/business/fi-1740_1_house-panel. Given First Executive’s large
junk bond holdings and CEO Carr’s close personal affiliation with Milken, investors and policyholders
began to exhibit jitters. In 1987, New York insurance regulators found the First Executive’s New York
insurance subsidiary had taken millions of dollars in credits for phony or backdated reinsurance from
First Stratford Life Co. of Delaware, a joint venture between First Executive and a holding company
owned 49 percent by Milken and some of his Drexel affiliates, and issued a record fine. Scot J. Paltrow,
Enigmatic Fred Carr, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, at D1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1990-0408/business/fi-1602_1_junk-bond (backdating); Sabin Russell, State Probing Deal by Insurer to Cut Its
Debts, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1990, at C1 (discussing First Stratford Life Co.); Scot J. Paltrow, Wheel of
Fortune Turns Against First Executive, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 26, 1990), http://articles.latimes.com/1990-0126/business/fi-657_1_junk-bonds (discussing negative press and “nervous” investors). First Stratford
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either raise new equity capital or stop writing new business and go into
wind down.84 This set the stage for the third CDO. It was not an
underwritten product, and so we found no direct evidence of participation
by Milken and Drexel. We associate them by proximity, confident that we
are fair in so doing.
FE’s California insurance subsidiary Executive Life Insurance
Company (“ELIC”) set up six SPEs,85 formally distancing itself from them,
but in fact enjoying very close proximity. The SPE corporations were
wholly owned by limited partnerships, in which ELIC had a 99 percent
limited partnership stake.86 The SPEs were managed by an ELIC
consultant, formerly ELIC’s second most highly compensated employee.87
The SPEs were based in ELIC’s former headquarters building, in a suite
occupied by a four-person securities firm formerly known as First
Executive Securities Company.88 FE’s general counsel was the entities’
agent for service of process.89
ELIC transferred $789 million in junk bonds to the SPEs in exchange
for six tranched CDOs.90 The CDOs, taken together, were FE’s secondlargest investment position.91 The exchange of the debt for the bonds
appears to have been done at par rather than at fair market value; the sixhad 69 percent of its own assets in junk bonds, the highest percentage for any life insurer. Sabin
Russell, Junk-Bond Woes Snare Insurers, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 1990, at C1. Reinsurance from First
Stratford supported $558 million of Executive Life of New York’s reserves. Id. The New York
insurance regulation action forced Executive Life of New York to raise its capital. Kristof, supra note
75. The California subsidiary, ELIC, was permitted to give its New York sister $151 million to meet
New York regulators’ capital demands. Id. But the California Department of Insurance then wanted
ELIC to boost capital. ELIC received $175 million in cash and $170 million in a (backdated) note from
its parent—raising its net worth to $204 million in 1987. Id.
84. Kristof, supra note 75.
85. ELIC held around 65 percent of its assets in junk bonds. Sabin Russell, State Reviewing Deal
by LA Insurance Firm, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 1989, at B1.
86. Press Release, Bus. Wire, DOI Completes Executive Life Exam, Orders Action (Jan. 19,
1990).
87. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds—A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, 17 INS. FORUM 81, 81 (1990). The periodical’s first
reporting on the transaction has the transfer as $771 million in junk bonds to six corporations, rather
than partnerships. Id. at 82.
88. Id. at 81–82.
89. Id. at 81.
90. Insurer Failures: Regulators Failed to Respond in Timely and Forceful Manner in Four
Large Life Insurer Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 10 (1992), [hereinafter GAO Insurer Failures]
(statement of Richard L. Fogel, Assistant Comptroller General, General Government Programs,
Government Accounting Office), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat6/147526.pdf.
91. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 82.
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way split avoided the requirement of reporting the investments in FE’s
annual report.92 The CDOs do not appear to have been rated,93 and ELIC
never resold them.94
Indeed, it never sought to do so, for the transaction was purely a
regulatory arbitrage play. Insurance companies are required to maintain a
special reserve of capital to protect against losses to their investment
portfolio. This reserve, known historically as the Mandatory Securities
Valuation Reserve (“MSVR,” now called the Asset Valuation Reserve or
“AVR”), was determined based on risk-based capital factors set by the
Securities Valuation Office of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners. Different types of assets in insurance companies’
investment portfolios received different risk-based capital factors, which
determined the level of the MSVR required for the asset.95 For example,
junk bonds (rated CCC and lower) carried a 20 percent reserve
requirement,96 whereas BBB-rated bonds had just a 2 percent requirement,
and bonds rated A or higher had a 1 percent requirement.97 Thus, $100
million in junk bonds required $20 million in reserves, whereas $100
million in AAA-rated bonds required only $1 million in reserves.
For unrated bonds, the regulator assigned reserve requirements based
on various bond characteristics. Bonds that were either an “amortizable
privately placed bond, or other amortizable bond for which no market
quotation is readily available,” are categorized as “Yes” and get a 2 percent
reserve requirement.98 Bonds classified as “No*” or “No,**” namely bonds
92. Id.
93. See Anise C. Wallace, Making “Junk Bonds” Respectable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1989, at
D1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/15/business/market-place-making-junk-bondsrespectable.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (providing no ratings for FE’s CDOs).
94. Id. Daniel Fischel argues that the CDO was “designed to be easier to sell than the underlying
high-yield bonds” and implies that the California Insurance Department wrongly concluded that the
CDO was merely designed to improperly lower reserve requirements. FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 290.
Fischel’s argument fails, however, if First Executive never resold the CDOs. There is no evidence that it
did.
95. GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 10, 14.
96. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-35, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: INSURANCE REGULATION, WEAK OVERSIGHT ALLOWED EXECUTIVE
LIFE TO REPORT INFLATED BOND VALUES 13 (1992) [hereinafter GAO INSURANCE REGULATION
REPORT].
97. Shauna Ferris, “Someone Else’s Problem,” The Failure of the Guarantee Security Life
Insurance Company, 16 AUSTL. ACTUARIAL J. 1, 26 (2010), available at http://www.actuaries.asn.au/
Libraries/Information_Knowledge/46305_AAJ_v16i1_comp.sflb.ashx.
98. Executive Life’s June Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 83. See also GAO INSURANCE
REGULATION REPORT, supra note 96, at 36 (providing the rating system).
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“classified as eligible for amortization only for life insurers which have
established and are maintaining a mandatory securities valuation reserve,”
receive 10 percent or 20 percent reserve requirements, respectively.99
All of the bonds ELIC transferred to the SPEs were likely “No*” or
“No.**”100 The two senior classes of CBOs ELIC received in return for its
junk bonds—around 90 percent of the deal—were classified as “Yes,” with
the junior class classified as “No.**”101 Figure 3, below, depicts the
transaction.
FIGURE 3. The First Executive CDO

By turning “No*” into “Yes,” ELIC was able to reduce its reserve
requirements by at least $110 million102 and thereby inflate its surplus,
despite the assets and the risks being exactly the same.103 As a FE
executive explained to the Wall Street Journal, the deal “create[d]
securities that were worth more than the underlying assets.”104
99. Executive Life’s Junk Bonds–A Case Study in the Manipulation of Investments to Improve
Their Apparent Quality and Provide Surplus Relief, supra note 87, at 83.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 84 (finding that ELIC reduced its reserve requirements by $126 million); Kathy M.
Kristof, First Executive to Take Big Loss on Junk Bonds, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at D1, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/1990-01-20/business/fi-112_1_junk-bond; Martin Mayer, Viewpoints: The
Latest Junk Bond Scam? L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, at D3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/199001-07/business/fi-82_1_junk-bonds/2 (finding that ELIC reduced its reserve requirements by $110
million).
103. GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 14–15.
104. Mayer, supra note 102.
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As a matter of economic theory, such alchemy is impossible.105 But
economic theory assumes away regulation. When a real world regulated
company faces a regulator’s demands for new capital, any legerdemain on
the right side of the balance sheet that provides relief is extremely valuable.
Other entities in the Milken menagerie took note of FE’s success. As one
news account related:
Thomas Spiegel, who built Columbia Savings & Loan of Beverly Hills, a
rival of Carr’s First Executive as Milken’s premiere customer, has
resigned from the deteriorating S&L and plans to work with the Wall
Street house of First Boston to repackage Columbia’s nearly $4-billion
junk bond portfolio into [CDO]s that can be sold for more than the assets
are worth.106

The CDO structure was now part of the Wall Street playbook.
Unfortunately for FE, its regulators didn’t buy it. A negative write up
in the industry press107 prompted the California Insurance Department to
examine the treatment.108 Disallowance followed in January 1990, forcing
FE to increase reserves by $110 million.109 The regulator probably had
little choice. January 1990 also saw FE disclose a $968 million loss on its
investment portfolio during the previous year.110 Similar losses on the junk
bonds in the SPE held out starkly negative implications for the value of the
CDO. The junk bond market had collapsed. California’s insurance
commissioner shut down ELIC in April 1991111 followed shortly thereafter
by the shutdown of FE’s New York insurance subsidiary by that state’s
insurance commissioner.112 Michael Milken pled guilty to six counts of
securities fraud in April 1990, and in May 1991 FE filed for bankruptcy.113
It was the largest insurance company failure in U.S. history.114 The go-go
105. See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and
the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 262 (1958) (explaining that “marginal yield on
physical assets is equal to the market rate of interest”).
106. Mayer, supra note 102.
107. Eric N. Berg, An Eye on the Insurance Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1990, at D1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/17/business/an-eye-on-the-insurance-industry.html (noting that
regulators first noticed the First Executive CBO because of a newsletter by Indiana University
insurance professor Joseph M. Belth, THE INS. FORUM).
108. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 327.
109. Id. at 328. See also GAO Insurer Failures, supra note 90, at 15 n.6 (“In December 1989,
California regulators made Executive Life reverse the bond transactions and recalculate its MSVR.”).
110. DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Gilson, supra note 35, at 293.
111. Id. at 298.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Scott E. Harrington, Policyholder Runs, Life Insurance Company Failures, and Insurance
Solvency Regulation, 15 REGULATION 27, 28–29 (1992).
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junk bond era was over.
C. SUMMARY
What was so wrong with FE’s deal structure? As a formal proposition,
the junk bonds were transferred pursuant to a contract of sale between the
company and an independent entity. But in substance the SPE transferee
was FE’s alter ego. FE held 99 percent of the equity interest in the SPE,
using a limited partnership structure to vest nominal control in a general
partner, who happened to be a former FE executive. The entity was
physically lodged with another FE affiliate. Meanwhile, the “independent”
entity had no assets other than the swapped bonds, which were booked at
par and paid for with its own promissory note. Any decrease in the bonds’
value meant nonpayment on the note with the resulting loss of value
flowing back to FE’s balance sheet dollar for dollar. In truth, there was no
there, there. FE was swapping pieces of paper with itself. Eleven years later
Enron would do the same thing.
The media coverage of the Milken scandal never delved deeply into
Milken’s financial dealings. Instead, the press focused on the clash of
cultures between a white shoe Wall Street and a larger-than-life, upstart
Jewish bond trader,115 and lurid tales of insider trading, bad toupees,
partying, and excess.116 Even a quarter century later, we still do not have
the full story of Michael Milken’s dealings.
The true Milken scandal lay in the alleged but unproven junk bond
daisy chain and its connection to takeover transactions that made money for
some but caused economic and social dislocation for others. Junk bonds’
economic disruption was the occasion for, but not the subject of, Rudy
Giuliani’s prosecution and conviction of Michael Milken for relatively
trivial securities law violations.117 The mismatch was to be repeated.
115. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 4–7 (attributing Milken’s prosecution to “the public’s
historic distrust and envy of financiers”); BRUCK, supra note 81, at 205, 331 (describing anti-Semitic
reactions to Drexel’s success).
116. See BRUCK, supra note 81, at 11, 14–15.
117. See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD
INTENTIONS 96–97 (2000) (arguing that prosecutors “criminalized regulatory infractions"). Daniel
Fischel described U.S. Attorney Rudolf Guliani’s prosecutorial approach as follows:
Giuliani saw RICO’s amorphous language as a potent weapon to rubber-hose and coerce
guilty pleas and punish those who refused to cooperate. He had already pioneered the
criminalization of such standardless offenses as insider trading, stock parking, and
manipulation. Now the government could claim that the same underlying conduct that
supposedly provided the basis for these standardless offenses also constituted a “pattern of
racketeering activity” that justified a RICO prosecution. By this bootstrapping logic, Giuliani
was able to drop the equivalent of a nuclear bomb on any target, at any time, no matter how
trivial or harmless the underlying conduct.
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III. THE FULCRUM: BISTRO
In following years, other more respectable insurance companies
succeeded where FE failed, getting junk bonds off of their balance sheets
and into SPEs funded by CDOs with their regulators’ approval. In these
deals, either the insurer or its holding company would take the junior CDO
tranche, with the most concentrated risk, while the senior pieces would be
sold to outside investors.118 Regulatory capital relief was achieved, even if
most risk remained within the insurers’ corporate groups. Indeed, as the
1990s progressed, structured financings involving the securitization of
bonds and loans became a routine affair. By 1996 annual issuance of CDOs
FISCHEL, supra note 41, at 123.
118. In 1991, Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. did a CDO deal, selling $375 million on
junk bonds and junk private-placements to the CDO, which financed the purchase by issuing notes and
equity. Steven Bavaria, Will Connecticut Mutual’s Junk CBO Start a Trend? INVESTMENT DEALERS’
DIG., Dec. 23, 1991, at 25. Connecticut Mutual was the investor for a $90 million cushion of equity and
junior debt that comprised a 24 percent first loss position. Id. The effect of Connecticut Mutual’s deal
was much like FE’s—it moved $375 million of junk from the insurer’s books and replaced it “with
$90M of assets containing more concentrated but less publicly visible risk.” Id. The $90 million
retained had a considerably higher yield than the original $375 million. Id. The transaction reduced the
junk asset percentage of Connecticut Mutual’s investment portfolio. Id. This was important because
junk asset percentage was the public litmus test of insurer risk after the failures of First Executive and
another life insurance company, First Capital, both of which were major junk bond investors. Id.
Having a lower percentage of junk assets in portfolio helped Connecticut Mutual’s agents market its
policies, as “Questions about junk bond holdings are at the top of the list of questions potential
policyholders ask when considering one company versus another.” Id. Connecticut Mutual’s
securitization was again being done to mask a company’s real financial position. As with First
Executive, some insurance officials were concerned, describing the deal “as mere window dressing.” Id.
But an important distinction should be noted. Even as Connecticut Mutual retained the residual risk on
the portfolio, it sold most of the risk to third parties.
A few years later, the Equitable Life Assurance Society of America undertook a CDO, EQ
Asset Trust 1993, to upgrade the credit quality of its portfolio, by swapping out junk assets, including
numerous defaulted bonds, for higher rated CDO assets. Anne Schwimmer, Equitable Clears Decks of
Junk with $700M Deal, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Oct. 18, 1993, at 12. Equitable Life sold $703
million of privately placed notes to a CDO it created. Equitable Debt Sale Yields $700 Million,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 78. Equitable Life and its affiliate Equitable Variable Life
then purchased the $200 million mezzanine Class B tranche of the CDO’s notes. Anne Schwimmer,
Equitable Clears Decks of Junk with $700M Deal, INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Oct. 18, 1993, at 12.
Half of the Class B notes were rated investment grade, thereby giving Equitable Life relief from its
NAIC reserve requirements, which only applied to the life insurer itself, not its holding company, The
Equitable Companies, which purchased the $50 million of Class C junior notes and $50 million of the
CDO’s equity. Id. Equitable Life’s affiliate DLJ purchased the entire $325 million AAA tranche, which
it resold in the private placement Rule 144A market. Equitable Debt Sale Yields $700 Million,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Jan. 24, 1994, at 78. Equitable Life used the cash proceeds from the sale to
purchase investment grade assets. Id. The transaction allowed Equitable Life to transmogrify its junk
assets into investment grade assets, while still maintaining the yield—and the risk—within its corporate
family.
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had risen to $18.6 billion.119 But, there were some structural sticking
points. This part describes the Bistro securitization, the deal that
surmounted the sticking points, situating it in the business context of a
hypothetical bank in 1997. Section A begins with the transaction structures
that served as Bistro’s building blocks—asset securitization and the credit
default swap. Using a hypothetical bank, this section highlights the
functions that securitization and credit default swaps performed, but also
identifies transactional problems they were unsuited to solve. Section B
goes on to show Bistro emerge as a hybrid of the two structures suited to
solve the problems.
A. MOTIVATIONS
Imagine a large bank that makes loans to corporations and then holds
those loans to maturity. The bank has a corporate lending department that
maintains relationships with quality borrowers. There are constraints on the
relationships. The bank’s internal risk management policies limit the
amount that can be loaned to any given borrower, and the restriction
sometimes interferes with client relationships.120 Additionally, the bank is
required to support the loan portfolio with equity capital. Under the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision rules (“Basel I”), adopted by domestic
bank regulators, corporate loans require 100 percent support,121 which
translates into an equity cushion amounting to 8 percent of the loans’
principal amounts.122 The bank seeks a way to reduce the required amount
of equity because its alternate sources of funding, deposits and borrowing,
are cheaper. Cheaper capital means a higher return on assets and a higher
stock price. At the beginning of 1997, there were two ways to attack the
problems of lending limits and required capital, CDOs and CDSs.
As we saw in Part I, securitization provides an expeditious way to
liquidate the loans and turn them into cash. The bank already is doing this
with its portfolio of residential mortgages, getting them off of its balance
sheet by securitizing them and then relending the funds received from the
sale of the mortgage-backed securities. The replay loans generate fees for
119. Karen Sibayan, 1987 to Present: A Walk Down CDO Lane, ASSET SALES REP., Apr. 17,
2000. Multi-asset deals that mixed bonds and loans were being done also. Id.
120. TETT, supra note 12, at 44–45 (describing lending limits and other bank techniques used to
limit default risk).
121. BASLE COMM. BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT
AND
CAPITAL
STANDARDS
22
(1988),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.pdf.
122. Id. at 14.
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the bank. The bank also will have a contract with the SPE pursuant to
which it manages (or “services”) the loans in the securitized pool, an
additional source of fee income.123 Meanwhile, the bank’s base of assets is
smaller, but that is a good thing. When a smaller bank generates more
income, fundamental performance yardsticks like return on assets and
return on equity improve, and the bank’s stock price goes up. The bank is
now “asset light.”
Our bank could do more or less the same thing with its corporate
loans, transferring them to an SPE, which would issue CDOs.
Unfortunately, there are some sticking points. Here the interest rate profile
is unattractive. Our bank is large and strong and enjoys a low cost of
borrowing (in part from its access to deposits), as does its excellent
collection of borrowers. But even AAA-rated securities issued by an SPE
must pay a higher rate of interest than the bank does. So the bank loses an
advantageous spread by securitizing. In addition, CDOs work for
completed loans but not for committed but undrawn loans: the bank is
looking for ways to shift the risk of its loan commitments as well. Finally,
if the bank transfers a loan to an SPE, it must notify the borrower or, in
some cases, even obtain the borrower’s consent. Either way, the bank’s
relationship with the borrower, which is built on a confidentiality
agreement,124 is disrupted.125
The bank can surmount these problems with credit default swaps.
CDSs, which first appeared in the early 1990s,126 are derivative
transactions pursuant to which parties transfer the risk of default on debt
securities, called “reference obligations.” To sketch out a simple scenario,
123. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 46, at 37.
124. See J.P. MORGAN, THE J.P. MORGAN GUIDE TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES 73 (1999), available at
http://www.investinginbonds.com/assets/files/Intro_to_Credit_Derivatives.pdf [hereinafter MORGAN
GUIDE] (noting that credit derivatives allow banks to transfer risk but maintain confidentiality).
125. Cf. id. at 8–10 (observing that credit derivative confidentiality preserves borrower
confidentiality, protecting customer relationships). An additional sticking point should be noted. It is
common for the originating bank to retain the first loss tranche of a CDO, but if the tranche amounts to
8 percent of the principal amount in the pool, the bank ends up with no regulatory capital relief. Id. at
72.
126. The precise origin of the CDS seems shrouded in history. Various instruments for separating
credit risk from other risks, such as guarantees and bond insurance, have existed for decades. But the
particular derivative form of the transaction seems to date back to the early 1990s. Bankers Trust has
been credited with some of the earliest deals as far back as 1991. SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS, AND
MONEY: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES 269–70 (2006); TETT,
supra note 12, at 45–46. Morgan did its first deal in 1993, arranging for the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development to assume the credit risk on a $4.8 billion line of credit to Morgan’s
long-standing client Exxon, which was facing a $5 billion fine for the Exxon Valdez oil tanker spill.
TETT, supra note 12, at 46–47.
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the bank enters into a swap that references a loan in its portfolio. The bank
is the “protection buyer” and its swap counterparty is the “protection
seller.” The protection seller agrees to pay the principal amount of the loan
in the event the borrower defaults. In exchange for this commitment, the
protection seller receives periodic premium payments from the protection
buyer, here the bank; the riskier the reference obligation, the higher the
premium. Economically, the protection seller is selling insurance on the
reference obligation, making the protection seller “long” on the
obligation’s performance and the protection buyer “short” on the
obligation’s performance. From the point of view of the bank, no loss will
befall it on a loan under a CDS until two defaults occur—first, the loan
itself defaults, and second, the swap protection seller defaults.127
The CDS holds out an advantage over securitization because the loan
the CDS references is not transferred128—derivatives are contracts that
specify payments based on the performance of external securities; the
parties to the derivative need not own the securities referenced. As a result,
the loans referenced by the CDS just sit in the bank’s portfolio as if nothing
had happened. The bank retains its funding cost advantage accordingly.129
Effective risk transfer under a swap also frees up room under the bank’s
internal risk management guidelines for more lending to the client. More
importantly, risk transfer to another bank means regulatory capital relief.
Where corporate obligations carry a 100 percent equity capital
requirement—the full 8 percent—obligations guaranteed by another bank
require only 20 percent of the 8 percent or 1.6 cents of equity for every
dollar of principal amount. The regulatory authorities accept bank swap
counterparties as the functional equivalent of bank guarantors.130 And
banks do swap with other banks as a means to the end of loan portfolio
diversification.131
Unfortunately, to limit the universe of swap counterparties to other
127. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 16.
128. There are, accordingly, neither accounting nor tax issues. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 16.
130. Id. at 59. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION
AND REGULATION, SR 96-17, SUPERVISORY GUIDANCE FOR CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1996), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/sr9617.htm; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYSTEM, DIV. OF BANKING SUPERVISION AND REGULATION, SR 97-18, APPLICATION OF
MARKET RISK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS TO CREDIT DERIVATIVES (1997), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1997/SR9718.HTM. Note that the bank protection
seller must, in turn, support the risk taken with its own equity capital, limiting the utility of the device.
MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 59.
131. See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 394 (7th ed.
2012) (identifying the CDS as a means to limit banks’ risks).
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banks is to limit access to the swaps market, in which hedge funds and
other institutional investors that are not primary lenders take on the risk and
return of corporate lending without actually having to have money to lend
or the capacity to service loans.132 This is not the only limitation respecting
the use of CDSs to shift the risk of the bank’s corporate loans. Matching up
a given corporate loan with a given swap counterparty entails transaction
costs—you have to find an institution looking for that particular risk. A
further problem arises if the potential protection sellers want to conduct due
diligence on the borrower, for the bank’s confidentiality agreement with the
borrower gets in the way.133
In sum, the bank wants two things: to shift the risk of corporate loans
and to obtain regulatory capital relief. A conventional CDO would shift the
risk of corporate loans by transferring the loans. The bank, however, does
not want to transfer the loans. A CDS would accomplish the risk shift
without the transfer. But, in order to reduce transaction costs and surmount
the confidentiality problem, the loans to be swapped must be bundled into a
portfolio that can be evaluated as such as is the case with CDOs. In theory,
a CDS could be done on a portfolio basis. That portfolio CDS, however,
would not simultaneously satisfy the bank’s second objective of obtaining
regulatory capital relief.
B. BISTRO BREAKTHROUGH
Bistro solves the bank’s problems. It builds on the “credit linked note”
(“CLN”), a contraption that literally splices a securitization together with a
credit default swap.134
Let’s construct a simple CLN for the bank. Assume the bank is
132. Or to book the loans on their balance sheets. See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 16.
133. See TETT, supra note 12, at 57 (explaining that banks were originally hesitant to issue CDOs
for fear of breaking confidentiality and losing customers).
134. Anne Schwimmer & Philip Maher, Derivatives Pros Snubbed on Latest Exotic Product,
INVESTMENT DEALERS’ DIG., Nov. 29, 1993, at 5. SBC Warburg created a similar structure at the same
time, a $1.7 billion vehicle known as SBC Glacier Finance, Ltd. Glacier was completely funded via
CLNs, whereas Bistro had an unfunded super senior position. Ronald E. Thompson Jr., & Eva F.J. Yun,
Collateralized Loan and Bond Obligations: Creating Value Through Arbitrage, in HANDBOOK OF
STRUCTURED FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 251, 261–62 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998).
There appear to have been some early attempts to marry securitization with credit
derivatives, under the name of “credit derivative bonds.” We have been able to locate little information
about these products. Apparently they were marketed by “derivatives dealers including Citibank,
Bankers Trust Co., JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Brothers.” Schwimmer & Maher, supra, at
5. It is unclear whether any deals ever closed. These products seem to have involved an issuer that was
a party to swaps on a pool of reference assets, presumably owned by the swap counterparty. The
product was “essentially a synthetic version of a CBO equity tranche.” Id.
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seeking regulatory capital relief for a loan portfolio of $700 million
principal amount. We form an SPE. The SPE sells CLNs into the public
markets, raising $700 million in exchange for $700 million principal
amount. Since the SPE is not buying any mortgages or notes from the bank,
it retains the $700 million and invests it in U.S. Treasury securities. We
cannot stop here, for at this point the SPE is in a position only to pay its
note investors the rate on U.S. Treasuries minus its own transaction costs,
an uncompetitive yield. So we have the SPE enter into a CDS with the bank
that references the $700 million loan portfolio; the SPE is the protection
seller, and the bank the protection buyer. The SPE is now getting the CDS
protection premiums, which enable it to provide a higher yield on its
notes.135
But what is the point of swapping with a shell entity like an SPE? The
answer is the same as the one given in regard to the purchase of a note
issued by an SPE—it depends on the assets in the SPE. This one has $700
million of Treasury securities to cover the risk of default on the reference
portfolio and so makes sense as a CDS counterparty; the SPE is fully
funded and conducts no other business in which it could lose money, so it
does not present the counterparty default risk of a real operating entity. To
the extent that defaults occur in the reference portfolio, they come at the
expense of the note holders. The SPE will liquidate its Treasury securities
to the extent necessary to cover its obligations under the swap; as the
collateral in the SPE disappears, the value of the CLNs declines
proportionately, with the holders of the SPE’s junior tranches taking the
first loss, then the mezzanine, and finally the senior.
Importantly for the bank, the bank regulators accept credit default
swaps with SPEs as a basis for equity capital relief, looking through to the
assets in the SPE in setting the capital minimum. 136 In our CLN set up, the
SPE holds sovereign debt securities that have a zero percent risk-weighting
under Basel I capital requirements, which means the bank no longer needs
to support the loan portfolio with equity capital.137 For the bank, the CLNs
add up to a good deal so long as the value of the regulatory capital relief
exceeds the cost of the periodic payments on the swap. Importantly, the
relief is only from regulatory capital; there is no relief for purposes of
135. See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 24–25, 74 (noting that the additional risk of CLNs is
recognized by the fact that their yield “is higher than that of the underlying collateral and the premium
on the [c]redit [s]wap individually”).
136. Id. at 59–61.
137. Id. Note that we could tweak the returns on the CLNs upwards by placing debt securities
with higher yields in the SPE—securities like AAA CMOs. So doing will have a regulatory impact,
diminishing the extent of the minimum capital relief. Id. at 60–61.
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generally applicable accounting principles (“GAAP”) because even though
the risk of the reference portfolio is transferred from the bank to the SPE,
the actual title is not.
We now turn to the Morgan bank in 1997, where transaction engineers
were busy inventing Bistro. They wanted equity capital relief on more than
a mere $700 million loan portfolio. Thus, the first Bistro structure sold
$700 million of CLNs and deposited the proceeds in an SPE, using the SPE
as a swap counterparty to cover a Morgan loan portfolio made up of, not
$700 million of loans, but $9.7 billion to 307 borrowers!138 The mismatch
between the $700 million collateral in the SPE and the $9.7 billion in credit
exposure referenced by the swap amounted to a considerable departure
from the traditional securitization model.139
This was the tricky part. The purported solution lay in a combination
of credit risk analysis and tranching of the notes issued by the SPE.140 For
simplicity, assume that the Bistro SPE was structured to issue three
tranches of notes—junior, mezzanine, and senior (called “super senior” in
this context). Assume further that the SPE planned to issue and sell only
the junior and mezzanine CLNs, not the super senior CLNs. It turned out
that there was no way to package marketable super senior CLNs—the yield
would be too low to attract buyers.141 Accordingly the deal will be
structured on an “as if” basis. The SPE will sell $700 million junior and
mezzanine CLNs, the rights of which will be determined by reference to a
hypothetical super senior interest. Morgan took this package to the credit
rating agencies armed with an analysis asserting that it was inconceivable
that the widespread default on the reference portfolio could exhaust the
$700 million in the SPE.142 The agencies agreed and rated the junior
(which made up one-third of the pot) Ba2 and the mezzanine (the
remaining two-thirds) AAA.143
So far, so good.144 But the unfunded “super senior” tranche remained
a problem. Morgan planned to retain the super senior risk on the reference
138. TETT, supra note 12, at 54–55.
139. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 75.
140. Id.
141. TETT, supra note 12, at 53.
142. Id. at 54–55.
143. Id. at 55.
144. Bistro securities were accepted in the debt markets based on investment-grade portfolios. The
names of the borrowers and amounts were disclosed to the note buyers; in some European countries the
names were withheld due to bank secrecy laws, with only the “type” of credit being disclosed. MORGAN
GUIDE, supra note 124, at 78. The practice was that the loans in the reference portfolio were set as of
the closing date—there was no active management or trading of the portfolio loans. Id. at 79.
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portfolio.145 But it simultaneously wanted to get regulatory capital relief for
the entire $9.7 billion based on the $700 million in the SPE.146 It argued
that the “real” risk had been transferred to the holders of the junior and
mezzanine tranches. But Morgan’s regulator, the Federal Reserve Board
(“Fed”), did not buy it. So Morgan turned around and swapped the super
senior risk with an AAA-rated insurance company, AIG.147 AIG was paid
$0.02 cents per year per dollar of risk undertaken in the swap. This the Fed
accepted, AIG being the functional equivalent of a bank counterparty.148
The square was circled.
Bistro was a hit. Morgan promptly marketed the structure to other
banks looking for regulatory capital relief (and still other banks promptly
copied the structure and competed with Morgan).149 When marketing
Bistro deals to others, Morgan finessed the problem of super senior risk by
standing between the bank doing the protection buying and the SPE doing
the protection selling by swapping with both. When the smoke cleared,
Morgan had swapped with its bank customer for the super senior risk on
the other bank’s loan portfolio, taking the role played by AIG in its own
deal.150 Having Morgan as swap counterparty on the super senior meant
regulatory capital relief. Instead of holding eight cents of capital for every
dollar of loan, the bank would only have to hold a fifth of that—1.6 cents
for every dollar of loan on its books.151 Eventually, after marketing a bunch
of Bistro deals, Morgan decided it had accumulated too much super senior
risk on its balance sheet and looked to swap it with another party.
Ominously, Morgan went back to AIG, which was always willing to take
the risk.152
C. SUMMARY
Morgan’s Bistro followed from the same motivation as First
Executive’s CDO. In both cases a regulated financial company devised an
145. TETT, supra note 12, at 63–64.
146. Id. at 55.
147. Id. at 60–62.
148. MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 63.
149. Id. at 57–58.
150. TETT, supra note 12, at 62–63, 70.
151. See id. at 59 (describing capital relief shift from 100 percent to 20 percent). A question arises:
Aren’t Morgan’s bank capital requirements stacking up as it accumulates super-senior risk on the
portfolios of other banks? The answer is yes but not onerously so, due to the magic of a combination of
value at risk credit analysis and trading book treatment. Id. at 75. (“Provided that the third party bank is
able to apply internal models to its residual risk position in a trading book, this risk will not consume a
disproportionate amount of regulatory capital for the intermediating bank.”).
152. Id. at 70.
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innovative variation on securitization in order to get relief from mandatory
capital regulation. There also were striking structural similarities. In both
cases the regulated financial company “swaps” with a self-created entity. In
FE’s case the swap is the junk-for-note exchange; in Morgan’s case the
swap is a derivative contract. In both cases an asset-less SPE without an
equity base gets its asset on credit.
But there were also material differences. FE filled its SPE with assets
in exchange for the SPE’s own note, which meant that the SPE obligation
that bootstrapped FE’s regulatory capital was ultimately undermined by a
matching obligation on the original junk-for-note swap. The Bistro
structure brought in new risk capital, both on the sales of the CLNs and on
the super senior swap.
Let us strip Bistro down to its essentials. A promoter that seeks to
swap away the risk of a portfolio of securities sets up an SPE; the SPE
funds itself with borrowed money; the borrowed money is invested in super
safe securities that support a swap between the SPE and the promoter; and
the SPE’s note holders assume the economic risk of a decrease in the value
of the promoter’s securities portfolio, taking as compensation the swap
premium and the interest on the collateral—the SPE’s super safe
investment in Treasuries.
The structure could be tweaked in various ways. Could Treasuries be
replaced with any other valuable securities as collateral? Could the outside
investors be entities other than buyers in the market for securitized notes?
Might not another mode of financing do just as well? In Part IV we will see
Enron answer these questions in the affirmative, creating a toxic variant on
Bistro that bears a more than passing resemblance to the failed FE CDO.
Note also that Bistro employs a derivative contract to effect a hedge
for the holder of a portfolio of securities.153 That party reduces its risk,
selling it to another party that seeks to take the risk. This is one of the two
primary uses of a CDS. The other possible function is speculation—a party
can enter into a derivative contract to bet for or against the reference
obligation without actually owning it. Derivatives make it easier to place
such bets, because the bettor is not required to front the money to purchase
the asset on which the bet is made (when the bet is that the asset’s value
will increase, a long position) or to incur the cost of borrowing the asset
(when the bet is that the asset’s value will decrease, a short position).
Bistro accordingly could be adapted for speculation as well as
153.

See MORGAN GUIDE, supra note 124, at 74–76.
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hedging. Nothing requires the party in the position of the bank to own the
reference portfolio. The reference portfolio can be any debt portfolio, with
the protection buyer in effect making a bet that the portfolio will default. In
addition, nothing requires full funding of the SPE by the buyers of the
CLNs. After all, why pay the full amount of the note where the proceeds
are going to be invested in Treasury securities or some other low risk, low
return debt paper? The note buyer can hold onto that capital and make its
own investments. In this scenario, the Bistro deal cuts to the chase, putting
the note buyer on the hook as the CDS counterparty.154 After 1999, most
Bistro deals, by then termed “synthetic securitizations,” had both of these
features, so that the party in the bank’s position was neither required to
own the reference portfolio nor to procure full funding for the SPE. These
variations will be implicated in Goldman’s ABACUS deal, discussed in
Part VI.
IV. THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD: ENRON’S SWAPS
Down in Houston, Enron was watching the banks as they
disaggregated their balance sheets and raised returns. Much enthused,
Enron resolved to adapt the asset light strategy and high tech financial
innovation to the old industrial economy, grandly claiming that it would
transform the fundamentals of industrial organization. Unfortunately for
Enron, grand claims are one thing and making money another, and the face
of American industry would remain untransformed. One thing Enron did
manage to transform was the Bistro transaction structure. But Bistro, once
Enronized, would blow up in its creators’ faces and bring down their
company. This part looks at the explosion, highlighting the surprisingly
close connection between financial innovation at the banks, Enron’s
business plan, and the transactions at the center of the Enron scandal.
A. ASSET LIGHT FROM WALL STREET TO MAIN STREET
To understand Enron’s business plan is to see the positive side of
Bistro. One must momentarily resist the temptation to compare Bistro to
the latest tax shelter and dismiss it as a financial innovation motivated by
regulatory avoidance and holding out no other advantages. To see the
154. See Michael S. Gibson, Understanding the Risk of Synthetic CDOs 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
FEDS Working Paper No. 2004-236, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/apaers.cfm?
abstract_id=596442) (“CDO ‘investors’ take on exposure . . . effectively selling credit protection to the
CDO ‘issuer.’”). In this scenario, any regulatory capital relief for the protection buyer will depend on
the identity of the note holder. But because the protection buyer does not own the reference portfolio,
regulatory capital relief is not its objective.
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argument in favor is to begin with Bistro’s two building blocks,
securitization and CDSs. Both enable arm’s-length risk transfers that
theretofore had not existed. Both facilitate the reallocation of bank
exposures to non-bank parties willing to take the risks. Securitization also
opens access to new sources of liquidity and funding by the banks.
Investors in securities issued by SPEs and CDS counterparties get access to
classes of investment that formerly were the banks’ exclusive preserve.155
As more investors take on more risk from the banks, risk becomes diffused
more widely, making the financial system safer (or so said many prior to
the financial crisis).
Bistro’s synthetic aspect also adds something—the opportunity to
create bespoke products. Risk and portfolio modeling have become more
sophisticated. Managers need products fitting very specific risk-return
profiles. Synthetic credit products, unlike primary credit products, can be
tailored to meet specific demands.
Summarizing the positive case, transactional technicians at the banks
created markets where no markets existed, creating opportunities for valuemaximizing exchanges. Their innovations helped complete markets and
improved the banks’ financial profiles by facilitating active management of
loan portfolios and increased return on assets.
Jeffrey Skilling, who became CEO of Enron in 2001,156 was much
impressed by the pattern of innovation in the financial sector and in
particular by the resulting increase in return on assets. Financials were
yielding better returns on capital than the energy industry: “[I]t’s very hard
to earn a compensatory rate of return on a traditional asset
investment. . . . In today’s world, you have to bring intellectual content to
the product, or you will not earn a fair rate of return.”157
Enron aspired to make like the banks. If the banks could become more
nimble and profitable by transferring assets from their balance sheets to
buyers in new liquid trading markets, so could Enron. It would leave
behind its original business, the asset-laden production and transport of
natural gas, to become a pure financial intermediary. Enron would make
155. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, THE JOINT FORUM: REPORT ON SPECIAL PURPOSE
ENTITIES 7 (2009), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf. For some originators,
securitization also meant access to cheaper borrowing—by securitizing an A-rated borrower could
segregate a portfolio of assets 90 percent of which, once tranched, could command an AAA rating. Id.
at 12.
156. OnLine Extra: Q & A with Enron’s Skilling, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE (Feb. 12, 2001),
http://www.businessweek.com/2001/01_07/b3719010.htm?scriptFramed [hereinafter Skilling Q&A].
157. Id.
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money by making other companies asset light in turn. Much as the banks
were doing with securitization and CDSs, Enron’s intermediary business
would create markets where none existed. This wasn’t just an aspiration—
Enron was starting up markets that covered not just energy but anything
which could be traded—pulp and paper, metals, even broadband services.
Few limits were acknowledged—only “unique” products (“knickknacks”)
could not be brought into Enron’s trading space.158 Within the trading
space, Enron did another thing the banks were doing—it offered a line of
risk management products, most prominently over the counter derivatives
addressed to its customers’ exposure to price risks.159
To see how all of this was supposed to work, hypothesize the creation
by Enron of a new market in pulp and paper products. Jumpstarting a
market where none existed meant asset purchases by Enron; to be a pulp
and paper seller one needs an assured source of supply. If supply contracts
are unavailable, one must own the source of the product directly, here
timber tracts. Thus, matching pulp and paper buyers and sellers meant an
investment in land. Once Enron established itself as a seller, it would bring
other sellers together with timber buyers. As Enron saw it, such a new
market could grow spectacularly if many timber users had captive sources
of supply. Vertically-integrated forest products companies would notice the
Enron market. At first they would draw on it for marginal supplies. Over
time they would see that the Enron market had sufficient volume to supply
their needs at lower prices than did their captive timber sources. They also
would see that the Enron market made available price stability through the
purchase of derivative contracts. The product users would add this up:
where they once purchased captive sources of supply to insulate themselves
from upward price fluctuations in times of high demand, they now could
get both the lowest price and price stability through Enron’s intermediary
operation.160 Unbundling followed naturally: the companies in the industry
would go asset light, selling off their forest tracts and pocketing the gain.
Enron, having started the process by buying timber tracts, would in the end
158. Id.
159. See id. (noting Enron’s transformation into a “buyer and seller of . . . energy-related financial
derivatives”).
160. As Enron stated in its 2000 Annual Report:
In Volatile Markets, Everything Changes But Us. When customers do business with Enron,
they get our commitment to reliably deliver their product at a predictable price, regardless of
the market condition. This commitment is possible because of Enron’s unrivaled access to
markets and liquidity. . . . We offer a multitude of predictable pricing options. Market access
and information allow Enron to deliver comprehensive logistical solutions that work in
volatile markets or markets undergoing fundamental changes, such as energy or broadband.
ENRON, ENRON ANNUAL REPORT 2000, at 6 (2000), available at http://picker.uchicago.edu/
Enron/EnronAnnualReport2000.pdf [hereinafter ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000].
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divest the hard assets too, and continue to profit on its proprietary market.
Enron took two further cues from the banks. Just as mortgage pools
created value by diversifying risk across different borrowers and regional
housing markets, so did Enron claim to reduce risk for those who bought a
product through the network of contacts brought together in its market, a
risk reduction that isolated producer-sellers in the industry could not
duplicate. Skilling explained:
[T]he fundamental advantage of a virtually integrated system vs. a
physically integrated system is you need less capital to provide the same
reliability. . . . Nondelivery is a nonsystematic risk. If a pipeline blows
up or a compressor goes down or a wire breaks, the bigger your
portfolio, the greater your ability to wire around that. So, if for example,
I’m just starting in the gas merchant business and I’m selling gas from
central Kansas to Kansas City, if the pipeline blows up, I’m out of
business. For Enron, if that pipeline blows up, I’ll back haul out of New
York, or I’ll bring Canadian gas in and spin it through some storage
facilities. If you can diversify your infrastructure, you can reduce
nonsystematic risk, which says there’s a . . . very strong tangible network
effect. . . . But you’ve got to get big, you’ve got to get that initial market
share, or you’re toast.161

Moreover, just as the banks tailored risk management products for their
customers’ needs, so did Enron. It claimed that its financial innovators
provided a level of intelligence higher than that of a traditionally-conceived
marketplace: “[We] provide high-value products and services other
wholesale service providers cannot. We can take physical components and
repackage them to suit the specific needs of customers. We treat term, price
and delivery as variables that are blended into a single, comprehensive
solution.”162
In the end, Enron aspired to outdo the banks, bringing virtual
integration to the old economy and a new dawn of industrial organization:
There’s only been a couple of times in history when those costs of
interaction have radically changed . . . . One was the railroads, and then
the telephone and the telegraph. . . . [W]e’re going through another one
right now. The costs of interaction are collapsing because of the Internet,
and as those costs collapse, I think the economics of temporarily
assembled organizations will beat the economics of the old vertically
integrated organization.163
161.
162.
163.

Skilling Q&A, supra note 156.
ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 2.
Jerry Useem, And Then, Just When You Thought the “New Economy” Was Dead . . ., BUS.
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In Skilling’s projection, virtual integration would replace vertical
integration and force Big Oil, Big Coal, or Big Anything to split up into
multitudinous of micro firms, each working a niche. Enron would put the
whole back together through its trading operation, all the while securing
lower prices for all.164 The nexus of contracts firm hypothesized by Jensen
and Meckling would be realized in fact.165
B. A BISTRO OPENS IN HOUSTON
Problems festered beneath Enron’s veneer of big think. Enron had
been reporting steady increases of revenue and earnings. Its stock rose from
a low of $17 in 1996 to a peak of $90 in 2000 on expectations of further
increases.166 Meeting those expectations was becoming more difficult. For
one thing, there were competitors. It turned out that entry barriers were low
once Enron opened a new territory to market trading. Dozens of
competitors were vying for its bread and butter businesses, undercutting its
profit margins.167 For another thing, Enron had just made a particularly big
gamble that was not coming in. It had invested $1.2 billion to jumpstart a
market in bandwidth by building a national fiber optic network.168 In 2001
the broadband operation was burning $710 million a year with no profit in
sight.169 Worse, the stock market, besotted with broadband in 2000,
abruptly changed its mind as overcapacity and financial distress hit the
business. That meant trouble for Enron, whose stock had levitated to close
to $90 on broadband enthusiasm. Enron’s stock fell along with all the
others,170 losing 39 percent of its value in the first six months of 2001.171
2.0, Aug.–Sept. 2001, at 69, 74.
164. A Survey of Energy: The Slumbering Giants Awake, ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 2001, available at
http://www.economist.com/node/497418.
165. Jensen and Meckling took the large firm and explained it as by-product of equilibrium
contracting by rational economic actors. Given the complexity of relations among actors in the
complex, agency cost reduction emerged as the problem for solution in the economics of firm
organization. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 16, at 310. For an explication of the theory, see William
W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1478–80 (1989). Enron
aspired to use real world market contracting to unwind Jensen and Meckling’s contractual complexes
into simpler, more transparent units. With each unit directly disciplined by the market for its own
product, agency costs inevitably would be less of a problem.
166. C. William Thomas, The Rise & Fall of Enron, 193 J. ACCT. 41 (2002), available at
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRiseAndFallOfEnron.htm.
167. Wendy Zellner & Stephanie Anderson Forest, The Fall of Enron, BUS. WK., Dec. 16, 2001,
at 30, available at http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2001-12-16/the-fall-of-enron.
168. Id.
169. George J. Benston, Fair-Value Accounting: A Cautionary Tale from Enron, 25 J. ACCT. &
PUB. POL’Y 465, 474 (2006).
170. Zellner & Forest, supra note 167, at 34–35.
171. Id. at 33. Enron also had made a number of big-ticket, old-economy investments abroad, all
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Compounding its losses, Enron had a portfolio of “merchant
investments” stuffed with large block holdings of stock in technology and
energy companies. Enron’s income statement had reflected unrealized
gains on the portfolio as the tech bubble rose. A falling market would do
the opposite. Exacerbating the problem, the stock issues were illiquid and
thinly traded; hedges were either expensive or unavailable.172 This left
Enron in roughly the position of Morgan in 1997: It needed a swap
counterparty for a portfolio of illiquid investments. As the market was not
bringing forth that counterparty, Enron, like Morgan, needed to create it.
1. Chewco and LJM
Enron was a heavy user of SPEs.173 This followed from the asset light
strategy—it was easier to engineer the transfer of an asset to an SPE than to
negotiate a sale to a third party. It also followed from the need to
manufacture earnings—once an asset was off balance sheet in an SPE,
Enron could engineer transactions with it that generated earnings. Asset
light also meant debt light. Enron needed to maintain an investment grade
credit rating to maintain credibility as a trading entity, and that meant
limiting the amount of debt on its balance sheet. SPEs were useful there
too, for they could be used as off-balance-sheet borrowing conduits.
Finally, Enron sometimes wanted to transfer an asset to an SPE and book a
gain but could not find a third-party lender. It went ahead anyway, just
taking the SPE’s own promissory note as payment.
Under the accounting rules of the day, Enron’s SPEs fell into a
residual, somewhat underspecified category.174 As with securitization, a
of which were performing badly. Among others, there was a $3 billion power plant in Dahbol, India; a
$1.3 billion purchase of the main power distributor to Sao Paulo Brazil; and a $2.4 billion purchase of
the Wessex Water Works in Britain. Id. at 32 (providing the cost figure for the purchase of the Dahbol
plant); MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE
OF ENRON 194–95 (2003) (providing the cost figures for the Sao Paulo and Wessex plants).
172. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. 77 (2002) [hereinafter POWERS REPORT]
(regarding stock in Rhythms NetConnections, Inc., the report explains, “given the size of Enron's
position, the relative illiquidity of Rhythms stock, and the lack of comparable securities in the market, it
would have been virtually impossible (or prohibitively expensive) to hedge Rhythms commercially”).
173. Enron’s 2001 10-K listed more than 3,000 affiliated entities. William W. Bratton, Enron and
the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1305 (2002).
174. Compare ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENT OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 125 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1996), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas125.pdf (defining SPEs generically), with
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENT OF
LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000),
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf (providing specific guidelines for defining and

2013]

TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL

827

true sale to a bankruptcy-remote entity was necessary to qualify as an
SPE.175 It was also thought that 3 percent of the SPE’s total capital must
come from an outside equity investor,176 who had to have the power to
control the disposition of the asset in the SPE.177 In addition, the outside
equity capital had to be “at risk”—Enron, as originator, could not guarantee
the investment’s results.178
The outside equity requirement had a way of getting in Enron’s way.
Enron’s managers wanted deals done quickly and outside risk money could
be hard to scare up. In 1997, Skilling decided that a cluster of assets (with
associated liabilities) needed to be put into an SPE on the double. Enron’s
managers dutifully formed an SPE called Chewco (after the Star Wars
character, the wookie Chewbacca) to buy the asset with borrowed money
guaranteed by Enron.179 Enron went on to book “nearly $400 million” of
revenue and gains respecting transactions with Chewco.180 Unfortunately,
Enron had never gotten around to finding the 3 percent outside equity
investor needed to qualify Chewco as an independent SPE, concealing the
fact. The arrangement came to light within Enron in fall 2001. All previous
accounting entries respecting the SPE were disqualified with the result that
Enron’s earnings from 1997 to mid-2001 were retroactively reduced by
$405 million.181 Meanwhile, the SPE’s return to Enron’s balance sheet
transferring SPEs).
175. ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 140, at 4–5, 7, 9–10
(Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas140.pdf.
176. The 3 percent test is an SEC accounting rule. It originated in a 1991 letter of the Chief
Accountant of the SEC issued in respect of a leasing transaction. The GAAP authorities were EITF
Topic D-14, “Transactions involving Special Purpose Entities,” EITF 90-15, “Impact of Nonsubstantive
Lessors, Residual Value Guarantees and Other Provisions in Leasing Transactions, “ and EITF 96-21,
“Implementation Issues in Accounting for Leasing Transactions involving Special Purpose Entities.”
The SEC insisted that there is no bright line 3 percent test and that the level of outside funding should
follow from the nature of the transaction. William W. Bratton, Rules, Principles, and the Accounting
Crisis in the United States, 5 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 7, 22–23 & n.50 (2004). The accounting
profession nonetheless treated the standard as a numerical rule. Id.
177. Testimony of Edmund L. Jenkins, Chairman, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Before
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
107th Cong. 11 (2002), available at http://www.fasb.org/testimony/testimony.pdf [hereinafter Jenkins
Testimony]. This meant that the outside equity holder had to hold at least a majority of the SPE’s equity.
Id. If the equity participation is minimal—at the 3 percent level—then it must own 100 percent of the
equity. Id. at 9.
178. Id. at 10.
179. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 42–44.
180. John Emshwiller, Fall of an Energy Giant: Andersen CEO Apparently Testified Inaccurately,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2002, at A4.
181. See POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 41 (setting out Enron’s annual profit disallowances
from 1997 to 2000).
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increased Enron’s total indebtedness by $628 million.182 We will see that
this was not even the largest SPE disqualification to occur at Enron in fall
2001.183
Enron’s CFO, Andrew Fastow, concocted a convoluted solution to the
outside equity problem. In 1999, he organized two limited partnerships,
LJM Cayman. L.P. (“LJM1”) and LJM2 Co-Investment L.P. (“LJM2”).184
LJM1 and LJM2 raised $390 million from institutional investors on the
promise of a piece of the best deals from Enron.185 In fact, the entities were
formed to participate as the outside equity investor in SPEs set up by
Enron, solving the compliance problem that had led to under-the-table
dealings at Chewco.186 Fastow controlled LJM1 and LJM2, serving as the
managing member of their respective general partners.187 The setup, rife
with self-dealing, looked more than a little awkward.188 Indeed, it bore a
more than passing resemblance to the sham limited partnership FE had set
up for its CDO swaps. But at least asset light transactions could be set up
and executed smoothly and quickly.
2. Bistro Inferno
Recall that Enron was worried about the income statement effect of
losses on a portfolio of tech and energy stocks. Equity swaps might have
solved this problem. These are everyday hedging vehicles for holders of
large, undiversified equity stakes, such as executives holding sizable
positions in their own companies’ stock. Ordinarily the counterparty is a
financial institution and the swap’s duration is short or intermediate term.
To describe a very simple transaction, if the stock subject to the swap goes
up during the period of the swap, the executive pays the bank the amount of
the price increase. Since the executive is hedging and owns a block of stock
in the company, the transaction is a wash so far as the executive is
concerned because the loss on the swap is matched by the gain on the
stock. If the stock goes down, the bank pays the amount of the decrease to
182. Id. at 42.
183. See Enron Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 5 (Nov. 8, 2001) (discussing the
disqualification of additional Enron income).
184. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 67–70 (discussing the formation of LJM1 and LJM2).
185. The investors included J.P. Morgan Chase, Citigroup Inc., Credit Suisse First Boston, and
Wachovia; Merrill Lynch, which marketed the interests, also kicked in $22 million. John R.
Emshwiller, Anita Raghavan & Jathon Sapsford, How Wall Street Greased Enron’s Money Engine: The
Financial Firms’ Many Well-Paid Roles Raised Many Conflicts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2002, at C1.
186. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 3.
187. Id. at 73–74.
188. The Powers Report questions whether an adequate separation of control ever really was
achieved. Id. at 74–75.
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the executive. The bank in turn hedges its downside risk on the stock by
selling the stock short or purchasing a put option on the stock.
But the swap market did not have the depth to cover the equity
securities in Enron’s portfolio.189 So Enron took a cue from Morgan and
Bistro and created a series of SPEs to act as counterparties.
Enron’s first step was to find a 3 percent outside equity investor, a
step unneeded with Bistro due to different accounting rules. That was
LJM’s job, and it invested in every SPE in the series. (Whether these
investments were large enough to meet the 3 percent test is a much mooted
question.190 Let us assume for the moment that they were.)
The remaining steps in Enron’s swap setup admit a direct comparison
with Bistro. The next step, as at Bistro, was funding the SPE followed by
investment by the SPE. The result was an asset base within the SPE that
provided the financial wherewithal to support a swap. With Bistro, the
funding came from outside lenders, with the proceeds of the loan being
used by the SPE to buy super safe debt securities. With Enron’s SPEs, the
asset base was Enron stock transferred to the SPE by Enron in exchange for
a promissory note from the SPE to Enron. In all, Enron transferred to the
LJM-related SPEs $1.2 billion worth of stock and rights to purchase more
stock plus $150 million of Enron notes in exchange for $1.5 billion face
amount SPE notes.191 Enron also increased its shareholders’ equity by $1.2
billion to reflect the issue of its stock to the SPEs.192 As with Bistro, then,
there was debt financing, but not from an outside source—it was as if
Morgan itself had loaned the money to its SPE swap counterparty. As with
Bistro, the SPE ended up with an asset base, but here that asset base was in
its own promoter’s common stock, rather than in super safe debt
securities.193
Note too that in Enron’s case no money changed hands at the funding
stage. The SPE was funded by shunting pieces of paper across a table at
189. Id. at 96–98.
190. Id. at 83–84.
191. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48–49.
192. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 24.
193. In one particularly egregious arrangement, Enron’s middle management had no Enron stock
available to fund the SPE. Instead of going to the board to get more authorized, they funded the SPE
with a block of the same stock being hedged by the swap. Needless to say, the SPE became insolvent
rather quickly when the stock went south. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 114–17. The stock in the
SPE was that of The New Power Company, an Enron startup slated to market power directly to
consumers. The enterprise flopped rather badly. Rebecca Smith, New Power Saga Shows How Enron
Tapped IPO Boom to Boost Results, WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 2002, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB1017015132933556040.djm,00.html.
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Enron rather than through arm’s-length investments by outsiders. At Bistro,
in contrast, third-parties parted with $700 million cash. In fact, the closer
resemblance lies with the First Executive CDO setup, but at a step down
the credibility ladder. FE at least transferred a bond portfolio in exchange
for the SPE’s promissory note. Enron manufactured new shares of stock
out of whole cloth, betting that its stock market price would remain
buoyant and cover its tracks.
The SPEs entered into equity swap contracts with Enron with a
notional amount of $2.1 billion194 with the SPEs relying on their holdings
of Enron common stock to maintain enough value to cover any losses on
the swaps. The shares referenced by the swaps promptly went down,
however. Across the last five fiscal quarters before Enron entered
bankruptcy, the value of the referenced stock fell by $1.1 billion.195 Enron
marked the value of its rights under the swap contracts to market for
income statement purposes, even though no gain had been realized. The
swaps, by thus covering $1.1 billion of losses, added $1.1 to Enron’s
income during the period.196 In the end, the swaps contributed 72 percent of
the net income reported.197
Even as Enron was using the swaps to cover losses on its income
statement, its SPE counterparties were collapsing. The Enron common used
to fund the SPEs fell along with the stock referenced by the swaps. Once
Enron stock’s value fell below the SPEs’ exposure on their swaps, the SPEs
became insolvent. Enron’s middle managers tried a series of seat-of-thepants restructurings of the SPEs, concealing the difficulties from the board
of directors.198 But it was all to no avail. The stock protected by the swaps
was not going to go back up; the loss had to be covered by the Enron stock
or not at all and the Enron stock kept going down. Enron finally threw in
the towel, folding the SPEs and the swaps back onto its balance sheet in the
third quarter of 2001, restating past earnings downward and unwinding the
entry of $1.2 billion shareholders’ equity made upon the issue of the stock
to the SPEs.199
194. ENRON, ANNUAL REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48–49
195. POWERS REPORT, supra note 172, at 98.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 118–19.
199. Actually, that entry never should have been made in the first place. Under GAAP, notes
received in exchange for a company’s own common stock must be booked as deductions from
shareholders’ equity. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EMERGING ISSUES TASK FORCE,
CLASSIFYING NOTES RECEIVED FOR CAPITAL STOCK ISSUE NO. 85:1, at 1 (1985); SEC Staff Accounting
Bulletin No. 40, 46 Fed. Reg. 11513, 11522 (Jan. 23, 1981). The newly issued stock is credited to the
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Enron was bankrupt within a month of these disclosures.200 Later
investigations would reveal a long list of other sham transactions.201 But
the LJM swaps were by far the greatest in magnitude and, by virtue of their
disclosure before the bankruptcy, take pride of place as the transactions that
brought down the company.
C. IMPLICATIONS
What was so scandalous about these swaps? Bistro holds out a
comparative tool that helps us appreciate the insidious nature of Enron’s
structure. Where the Bistro SPE relied on outside lenders for its funding,
Enron’s SPEs followed the lead of First Executive and did their borrowing
from Enron itself, which also happened to be the party whose balance sheet
risk was being covered by the borrowed money. The risk accordingly was
never really externalized—if the SPE lost heavily on the swaps but without
exhausting the value of the Enron stock with which it was funded, it still
would have had no capital left to repay the loan from Enron. Thus Enron,
having covered $1.1 billion of losses under the swaps in the short run,
would in the long run have to write off $1.1 billion of SPE notes payable
(or a portion thereof). The only scenario that would avoid the write-off is if
the value of the Enron stock in the SPE increased by $1 for every $1 of loss
covered by the swaps.
The transaction structure would have been subject to question even if
the Enron stock had gone up. Stock goes up because of projected earnings
increases. Earnings projections depend in turn on recent earnings results. In
this case, Enron was stoking its earnings with a swap contract that derived
its economic substance from Enron stock, which in turn derived its
economic substance from positive earnings reports, reports that would not
be forthcoming absent the swap contract. This causal chain of stock to
earnings to stock to earnings to stock made the transaction and accounting
result intrinsically unsound.
The substance came down to this: Enron issued its own common stock
to cover a loss on its own income statement. This violates the most basic
rules of accounting, and indeed, the most basic rules of capitalism.
Corporations issue stock to raise capital. They then use the capital to do
capital stock account at the purchase price, but the capital stock accounts elsewhere are debited
(reduced) in the amount of the note.
200. Bratton, supra note 173, at 1322–23.
201. See Regan, supra note 14, at 1156–62, 1180–86, 1191–95 (describing various Enron sham
transactions).
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business and generate income. They are not permitted to skip the step and
enter the proceeds of the sale of stock directly into income. The value of a
firm stems from its ability to take the capital and earn money over time; its
stock market capitalization reflects projections of its ability so to do. Enron
used SPEs and swaps to subvert the system, using its market
capitalization—the value of its common—to support the value of its
common.
The surprising thing about the Enron scandal is that, for all the outrage
and fulmination, little attention was paid to the transaction structure’s
substantive implications. Everybody got the point that Enron’s earnings
were fake. Almost no one worked through the smoke and mirrors to see
how Enron had faked it and how fine the line was that separated Enron’s
fraud from transaction structures that were moving billions daily.
Significantly, Enron never concealed the LJM structures. Its financials
provided the financial community an adequate basis to do the analysis
above and start asking questions about the soundness of Enron’s results.202
Apparently, it lay beyond the system’s ability to comprehend. Transaction
engineers were inventing structures that only other engineers could
understand. The engineers worked with their eye on the asset light prize but
without working through the implications of downside scenarios, whether
for the promoter or the economy at large.
V. THE STILLBORN SCANDAL: THE SIVS
Enron also used SPEs as off-balance-sheet resting places for
underperforming assets and associated indebtedness. The arrangements
were conditional and put Enron back on the hook for the debt if its stock
price fell below stated levels. It received its final kick into bankruptcy
when those off-balance-sheet obligations came due.203 They went off like
roman candles during its last week of life.204
202. Enron noted the arrangement in the footnotes to its 2000 Annual Report. ENRON, ANNUAL
REPORT 2000, supra note 160, at 48. The report tells us of the hedges. Further, “Enron recognized
revenues of approximately $500 million related to the subsequent change in the market value of these
derivatives, which offset market value changes of certain [investments].” Id. The report further notes
that Enron transferred to the LJM-related SPEs more than $1.2 billion in assets, including millions of
shares of Enron common stock and long term rights to purchase millions of more shares, plus $150
million of Enron notes payable, and that the SPEs had paid for all of this with their own debt
instruments with a face amount of $1.5 billion. Id. We are not told in that sequence how the SPE will be
covering its $500 million loss exposure. It is, in short, all there. See ENRON, ENRON ANNUAL REPORT
1999, at 59 (1999).
203. Bratton, supra note 176, at 21.
204. The first GAAP coverage of SPEs came in ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF
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Tighter accounting rules followed the Enron scandal.205 Indeed, for all
intents and purposes, a full set of accounting rules for SPEs only emerged
following Enron. Prior to Enron, some types of SPEs, such as CDOs and
other securitizations, were already covered by elaborate rules promulgated
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), a private body
that sets forth generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”).206 In
contrast, accounting treatments respecting the residual category of SPEs
that included Enron’s SPEs developed at the level of practice. The “3%
outside equity rule” was not GAAP at all, but a convenient inference drawn
by reporting companies and their auditors from an SEC opinion letter about
a lease.207 The FASB had been grumbling about consolidation and offbalance-sheet treatments for years, but never got enough political wind at
its back to facilitate intervention.208 Enron changed the climate, opening a
door for a FASB pronouncement on the residual category, described as
“variable interest entities” (“VIEs”)209 in FASB Interpretation Number
46(R) (“FIN 46(R)”).210 The objective of the standard was to set out
principles, as opposed to rules, for identifying when entities related to a
reporting company but less than majority-owned should nonetheless be
consolidated with the reporting company due to contingent contractual ties
between them.211
FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards
No. 125 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1996). It was followed by ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND
SERVICING OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF LIABILITIES, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 140 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2000). For the most recent iteration, see
ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS—AN AMENDMENT TO FASB STATEMENT NO.
140, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 166 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009).
205. See Bratton, supra note 176, at 8–11 (detailing the enactment of stricter accounting rules
following Enron).
206. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles
Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1043–44 (2003).
207. Id. See also BARRY J. EPSTEIN, RALPH NACH & STEVEN M. BRAGG, WILEY GAAP 2010:
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 677–78
(2009).
208. Bratton, supra note 206, at 1040.
209. See CONSOLIDATION OF VARIABLE INTEREST ENTITIES, FASB Interpretation No. 46, at 11–
12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2003) (listing the conditions by which an entity becomes an VIE).
210. Id. There was also a series of follow-up FASB interpretations. E.g., DETERMINING THE
VARIABILITY TO BE CONSIDERED IN APPLYING FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R), Staff Position No.
FIN 46(R) (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006).
211. The bank regulators would not produce a response to Enron abuses until 2007. In 2003, in the
wake of Enron, the U.S. Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations called on federal financial
regulators to “immediately initiate a one-time, joint review of banks and securities firms participating in
complex structured finance products with U.S. public companies to identify those structured finance
products, transactions, or practices which facilitate a U.S. public company’s use of deceptive
accounting in its financial statements or reports.” PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE

834

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86:783

In the wake of Enron, the FASB’s prior rules-based approach to
standard setting had been widely criticized as ineffective and
manipulable.212 FIN 46(R) showed that the FASB had internalized the
criticism and was eminently capable of taking a principles-based approach.
The new standard elevated substance over form, looking through to the
economic risks of enterprise regardless of legal form. 213 Historically,
consolidation followed from control in the form of ownership of a majority
of the voting equity. SPEs revealed this approach’s limitations. Exhaustive
contractual instructions and high leverage combined to render the equity
interest more nominal than real, a formal incident without relevance to
either the entity’s management or its risks and returns, including the
residual risk and return. FIN 46(R) abandoned “equity ownership” as the
determinative mode of participation in favor of an open-ended concept of
“subordinated financial support.” If a party was exposed to most of the
entity’s losses, to most of the entity’s gains, or to both, consolidation would
follow.214 Sponsorship also mattered: on some fact patterns, the fact that an
interest holder “designed” the entity (or participated significantly therein)
S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, FISHTAIL, BACCHUS, SUNDANCE, AND SLAPSHOT: FOUR
ENRON TRANSACTIONS FUNDED AND FACILITATED BY U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 36–37 (2003).
Delayed by intense lobbying, it took four years for the federal regulators to issue their final
“Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk Complex Structured Finance
Activities.” See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOFCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter FCIC FINAL Report] (outlining reasons for the final statement’s
delay). The guidance instructed financial institutions to apply greater diligence, be more circumspect,
and better document elevated risk complex structured finance activities. Examples of such activities
were deals that:
[l]ack economic substance or business purpose; [were] designed or used primarily for
questionable accounting, regulatory, or tax objectives, particularly when the transactions are
executed at year end or at the end of a reporting period for the customer; [r]aise concerns that
the client will report or disclose the transaction in its public filings or financial statements in a
manner that is materially misleading or inconsistent with the substance of the transaction or
applicable regulatory or accounting requirements; [i]nvolve circular transfers of risk (either
between the financial institution and the customer or between the customer and other related
parties) that lack economic substance or business purpose; [and] [i]nvolve oral or
undocumented agreements that, when taken into account, would have a material impact on the
regulatory, tax, or accounting treatment of the related transaction, or the client’s disclosure
obligations.
72 Fed. Reg. 1372, 1378 (Jan. 11, 2007). This guidance did not contemplate transactions that banks
undertook for themselves, such as the creation of SIVs. Instead, it was designed to prevent banks from
facilitating Enrons, not making their own Enrons.
212. Bratton, supra note 206, at 1040.
213. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING FOR VARIABLE INTEREST
ENTITIES: FIN 46R AND OTHER RELATED
ISSUES
54–55
(2007)
[hereinafter
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS] (detailing the new principle-based approach).
214. EPSTEIN, NACH & BRAGG, supra note 207, at 684.

2013]

TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL

835

brought the entity into the VIE category.215
Consider a hypothetical. A sponsor floats an SPE, financing it with 3
percent outside equity and 80 percent outside debt. The remaining 17
percent of financing is a subordinated loan from the sponsor to the SPE.
The sponsor has also issued a guarantee to the lender representing half of
the outside debt. There would be a case for consolidation under FIN 46(R)
because the sponsor, while having provided only 17 percent of the capital,
bears the next 57 percent of the loss after the 3 percent outside equity and
thus most of the risk of loss on the entity. More generally, if the outside
equity amounted to less than 10 percent of the total invested in the SPE,
substantive scrutiny of contractual ties to a sponsor is particularly likely
under FIN 46(R). Since an equity layer under 10 percent was too thin to
soak up the expected losses, other interest holders potentially could be
deemed to hold the residual economic interest, or in the FASB’s
terminology, the “primary beneficiary.”
FIN 46(R) was a big step forward. Even so, the big banks managed to
continue with Enron-style off-balance-sheet investing and borrowing
without triggering consolidation. Their purpose was to expand levered debt
portfolios without showing the borrowing on their own balance sheets.
SPEs called Structured Investment Vehicles or SIVs were the means.216
At their height, SIVs were a $400 billion cutting-edge part of the
financial sector.217 They were touted as efficient financial innovation,218 the
“Rolls-Royce of modern finance,”219 and a must-have for any selfrespecting major financial institution.220 Yet the entire SIV sector
disappeared in little over a year between 2007 and 2008. The collapse of
the SIVs was a major step toward complete market breakdown in the fall of
2008. Despite this, the SIVs have attracted comparatively little attention,
both because their failure was dwarfed by later events and because they
were a little-known, esoteric part of the already complex structured finance
landscape. In our view, the demise of the SIVs is the scandal that never
215. More particularly, FIN 46(R) has a scope exception for conventional operating businesses
that is blocked for a designing interest holder. Id. at 682.
216. Once-Thriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, ASSET BACKED ALERT (Feb. 22, 2008),
http://www.securitization.net/news/article.asp?id=364&aid=7988.
217. John Mauldin, Taking Out the SIV Garbage, SAFE HAVEN (Oct. 20, 2007),
http://www.safehaven.com/article/8662/taking-out-the-siv-garbage.
218. See, e.g., Donna Mitchell, SIV Market Grows, So Do SIV-lites, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP.
(Aug. 21, 2006), available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-149763401.html.
219. HENRY TABE, THE UNRAVELLING OF STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES: HOW LIQUIDITY
LEAKED THROUGH SIVS 8 (2010).
220. Id.
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was, but should have been.
A. STRUCTURED INVESTMENT VEHICLES
The origins of the SIVs, like those of Bistro, lay in bank capital
regulations. The first round of risk-weighted bank capital regulations
(Basel I) went into effect in 1988. Basel I made it expensive for banks to
hold certain types of assets. Citigroup recognized that by creating an SPE
and transferring high risk-weight assets to the SPE, it could reduce its
regulatory capital requirements while at the same time using the structure
of the SPE to retain the economic benefits of the high risk-weight assets.221
The result was Alpha, the first SIV.222
The purpose, then, of a SIV was to do the same business as a bank,
arbitraging the spread in yields between long-term debt investments and
short-term liabilities but without relying on deposit-based funding. SIVs
had diversified portfolios of actively-managed, highly rated assets funded
through the issuance of medium-term notes and commercial paper. They
combined features of hedge funds, securitization, and traditional
banking.223 Like hedge funds, SIVs were thinly regulated and had a highly
sophisticated investor base.224 Also like hedge funds, the SIVs had
sponsors who maintained a continuing advisory relationship; the better the
SIV’s returns, the higher the stream of payments on the sponsor’s
management contract.225 Like securitization vehicles, SIVs were offbalance sheet, bankruptcy remote, and constrained in their activities by
operating limits and guidelines.226 And like traditional banks, SIVs were
levered with short-term borrowing and long-term assets.227
The difference between a SIV and a bank was that the SIV took no
deposits and hence was unregulated—a category of shadow bank. There
was thus a motivational tie to the Bistro structure. When a bank sold an
asset to a SIV the bank got regulatory capital relief plus liquidity leading to
further lending. Similarly, as with plain vanilla securitization, the issuance
of structured debt by SIVs enabled banks to capitalize the investment off221. Id. at 46–47.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 5–7.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 78.
226. Id. The sponsor devised an “operating manual” in consultation with the credit rating
agencies. The manual laid down the entity’s investment and financing strategy, constraining the
discretion of the manager. Id. at 78–80.
227. Id. at 78.
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balance sheet. There was even a cost advantage. Recall that when Bistro
was invented, the bank’s cost of borrowing was lower than that available
through securitization. SIVs solved that problem, earning AAA-interest
rates that could be lower than the rate paid by the bank on its own
borrowing.
SIVs’ assets were generally diversified but included some U.S.
mortgage-related securities.228 Whatever the asset class, virtually all SIV
assets were high investment grade, at least at the time of purchase. SIVs did
not want to be exposed to credit risk, on the theory that a base of super high
quality assets would lead to a maximal credit rating and a minimal cost of
borrowing. SIVs raised funds for their purchases of long-term assets by
issuing shorter-term liabilities.229 And, because all else being equal shortterm liabilities are less risky than long-term liabilities, they have lower
yields and thus result in a lower cost of borrowing. A duration arbitrage
resulted, allowing the SIVs to capture a spread. Because SIVs’ debt was
AAA-rated, they were able to invest in apparently safe assets and still make
a durational arbitrage profit—the spread between the return on their longterm assets and the lower costs of their short- and medium-term borrowing.
As the SIVs offered slightly higher yields than other AAA-rated short-term
debt, they were easily able to attract capital.230
Related to SIVs was a smaller class of entities known as SIV-lites
(memorably referred to by Gillian Tett as SIVs’ “mutant cousins”).231 SIVlites tended to invest more heavily in mortgage-related securities than
traditional SIVs.232 SIV-lites also differed from basic SIVs in that their
funding tended to be shorter term.233 The weighted average life of SIV-lite
liabilities was three to six months, half of that of the basic SIVs.234 They
also tended to have slightly lower leverage than basic SIVs as
228. Id. at 78. Newer SIVs tended to invest more heavily in mortgage-related securities. OnceThriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, supra note 216; Jacob Gaffney, In One Week, Two European
SIVs Face Liquidations, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP. (Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.securitization.net/
knowledge/article.asp?id=421&aid=7625.
229. TABE, supra note 219, at 6–7.
230. Id. at 122.
231. Gillian Tett, Why Financiers Have Missed the New Monster, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2007, 9:50
PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9ffb0bea-5cac-11dc-9cc9-0000779fd2ac.html. SIV-lites were a
concept born on the CDO desk of Barclays. NICHOLAS DUNBAR, THE DEVIL’S DERIVATIVES 194
(2011); Helen Thomas, Barclays and Cairn Capital Declare $1.6bn “SIV Restructuring Success”, FT
ALPHAVILLE (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2007/08/31/6965/barclaysand-cairn-capital-declare-16bn-siv-restructuring-success/.
232. Once-Thriving SIV Market In Financial Throes, supra note 216; Gaffney, supra note 228.
233. Primarily via one to three month repos or three to twelve month commercial paper. TABE,
supra note 219, at 125–26.
234. Id. at 129.
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compensation for their greater rollover risk.235
SIVs’ capital structures were relatively simple. They had notional
equity held by Cayman Islands or Jersey charitable trusts (an arrangement
not unlike Imperial Savings Association giving the junior tranche of its
second CDO to charity),236 and they issued short-term and medium-term
debt with a senior-subordinate structure.237 The most junior debt often had
an equity-like aspect in the form of a performance-sensitive upside cut of
the SIV’s returns.238
Why, though, would a bank give up the profit yielded by the spread to
an independent entity? The answer was that it need not and did not. The
bank entered into a management contract with the SIV and drained out
profits in the form of incentive compensation under the contract.239 In
addition to acting as investment advisors, SIV sponsors acted as dealers for
their SIVs’ investments and connected their SIVs with debt investors.240
235. Id. at 128.
236. SIVs’ formal equity was generally shares with a par value of $500 or $1000, which were held
by charitable trusts based in the Cayman Islands or Jersey for tax purposes. Id. at 119. SIVs would
generally have a Delaware subsidiary. Id. The SIV itself would issue Euro-denominated debt, and the
subsidiary would issue dollar-denominated debt (often co-issued with the SIV) that was eligible for
purchase by U.S. insurance companies. The debt would be collateralized by all assets other than those
pledged for repo transactions. Id
237. The majority of SIV debt was in the form of medium term notes (“MTNs”) with tenors of
one to ten years, but typically of thirteen to eighteen months. Id. at 124. MTNs made up 80 percent of
the typical SIV’s funding. Id. at 120. The other 20 percent was primarily commercial paper (“CP”) with
tenors of under a year. Id. The MTN and CP typically received AAA ratings and were tranched by
maturity and / or in senior-subordinate structures. SIVs also issued subordinated debt in the form of
“capital notes” or “income notes” with ten year tenors. Id. at 122. The capital notes were the SIV’s
functional equity, in that they bore the residual risk, and they sometimes had an “equity kicker” that
gave them excess spread and boosted yields by 200 bps. Id. at 121. The SIV’s managers shared profits
pari passu with the capital note investors, Id. at 160, and the SIV’s sponsor typically invested in the
capital notes. SIVs were not particularly leveraged. Their leverage ratio—in terms of senior debt (MTN
and CP) to capital notes tended to be around 13x, meaning that there were $92.30 in senior debt for
every $7.70 in capital notes. Id. at 127. Taken as a whole, the weighted average life (“WAL”) of SIV
liabilities was six to twelve months. Id. at 129.
238. Michael Ehrlich, Innovation, Regulation and Financial Bubbles: The Evolution of Structured
Investment Vehicles 8–11 (Leir Ctr. for Fin. Bubble Research, Working Paper No. 8, 2012), available at
http://www.leirbubblecenter.org/2012/03/innovation-regulation-and-financial.html.
239. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 155, at 55–56; INT’L ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS BD., INFORMATION FOR OBSERVERS 3–5 (July 23, 2008).
240. This function also could be outsourced. Former Moody’s SIV analyst Dr. Charles Tabe
describes SIV compensation arrangements as follows:
[M]anagement compensation was structured as a base fee and a performance fee. The base
fee was typically 25 basis points of capital raised. The performance fee was typically half the
vehicle’s profits or amounts left after the repayment of senior investors, ancillary costs, and
the fixed income component of capital note returns (Libor flat or Libor plus a small spread
which was again set at about 25 basis points).
An example might be helpful. Suppose the SIV manager raised US$1.5 billion in capital
notes and levered this 13.33 times, yielding an asset portfolio of US$20 billion (which was
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They also were often invested in their SIVs, taking subordinated debt that
was as a practical matter the equity in the entity and also soaked up a slice
of the profit. So long as the sponsors were not deemed to exercise control
over their SIVs for accounting and regulatory capital purposes, it was
another heads-I-win-tails-I-win asset light play.
The nature of SIVs’ funding meant that SIVs had to refinance between
20 percent and 50 percent of their debt every year, more in the case of SIVlites. Therein lay the risk. Investing long-term with short-term funds
requires periodic refinancing of debt in order to match maturities. This
made the SIVs dependent on steady access to the credit markets. Any
disruption to capital markets could spell disaster for SIVs that found
themselves illiquid.
Relationships between SIVs and their sponsors get complicated at this
point in the story. Bank sponsors committed to give their vehicles
“liquidity support,” that is, to provide funding (or to promise to repurchase
SIV assets) if the external markets proved unwilling. Under Basel I rules,
the banks were excused from holding regulatory capital against these
liquidity facilities.241 Such support was limited, however, typically in the
range of 5 to 10 percent of the entity’s asset base.242 As a result the SIVs
were highly exposed to disruptions in debt markets and the possibility of
having to liquidate assets quickly to pay down debt in the wake of the
lenders’ refusal to roll over their obligations.243
not atypical of second generation vehicles at their apogee). Net earnings after the repayment
of senior debt and ancillary costs typically averaged 35 basis points of the entire portfolio, or
US$70 million. Of this amount, capital note investors typically received their fixed income
payment of US$48.75 million (assuming a through-the-cycle Libor rate of 3%). After
subtracting this fixed income component and the base management fee of US$3.75 million,
the vehicle had US$17.5 million left to share equally between the manager (performance fee)
and the capital note investor (equity component of capital note returns). Thus, the SIV
manager received a total of US$12.5 million for the year in this example.
Email from Dr. Charles Tabe to Adam Levitin (July 29, 2012) (on file with author).
241. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. A, § 3(b)(4) (2009) (10 percent conversion factor for unused
portions of asset-backed commercial paper liquidity facilities of less than one year maturity); Id.
§ 3(b)(5) (0 percent risk-weighting for other unused commitments with less than one-year maturity or
for unused commitments with longer maturities that are unconditionally cancellable by the bank.).
242. EMMA-JANE FULCHER ET AL., FITCH RATINGS, THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRADITIONAL
ABCP CONDUITS AND SIVS, ABCP/EUROPE SPECIAL REPORT 2 (2008), available at
http://www.immfa.org/about/faq/ABCPconduits.pdf. Early era SIVs (that is, during the 1990s) were set
up differently. The bank sponsor offered 100 percent liquidity support for a one-year duration; all notes
issued were senior. As SIVs shifted to a mixed senior / subordinated note structure, the liquidity
commitment contracted. Ehrlich, supra note 238, at 7–11. By 2007 only about half of the SIVs were
sponsored by banks. The other half was sponsored by hedge funds. Id. at 11. Hedge funds sponsors
contracted with banks for back up lines of credit.
243. The risk created by SIVs’ asset-liability duration mismatch is perhaps clearest when
compared to a similar type of structured financial vehicle, the asset-backed commercial paper
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Even so, SIV investors often believed that there was unconditional
100 percent liquidity support, just as there was implicit credit risk recourse.
Fitch Ratings has observed, “Some investors believed that the investment
banks that were affiliated to the SIV management companies were
providing implicit liquidity support. The rationale was the potential
reputational risk faced by the bank if the SIV defaulted.”244
FIGURE 4. The Structured Investment Vehicle (SIV)

In sum, the asset-liability duration mismatch in the SIVs’ business
model posed a major risk. If SIVs were not able to roll over their short-term
liabilities, they would have to liquidate their assets to maintain leverage
(“ABCP”) conduit. ABCP conduits only issued short-term commercial paper (ten or equal to or less
than 364 days), whereas SIVs issued both commercial paper and medium term-notes (“MTN”). This
means ABCP conduits were more exposed to rollover risk than SIVs. To compensate, however, ABCP
had 100 percent liquidity facility support. This means that ABCP investors were exposed to credit risk
on the conduit’s assets, but not to market value risk, as the conduit would not be forced to liquidate its
assets at market prices to pay off its commercial paper that it could not refinance. SIVs, in contrast, had
only very limited liquidity support. TABE, supra note 219, at 175–76.
244. FULCHER ET AL., supra note 242, at 2. The former Moody’s SIV analyst has noted,
“Although sponsors had no legal obligation to support their vehicles, it was thought that a sponsor
would not allow its vehicle to default in senior debt for reputational reasons.” TABE, supra note 219, at
135.
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ratios and to satisfy investor redemptions. The business model assumed that
in the event of rollover failure, the SIV could delever by selling assets at
marked-to-market values without huge losses. This had been the case prior
to 2007 on the few occasions when SIVs got into trouble.245
It seems that no one seriously considered the possibility of a marketwide freeze, in which a rollover failure would force multiple SIVs
simultaneously to liquidate assets at depressed fire-sale prices, setting off a
“death spiral.” This is precisely what unfolded starting in the summer of
2007, as a panic swept up first the SIV-lites, then the newer SIVs that had
SIV-lite asset-characteristics, and then finally the older, more-established
SIVs.
B. THE SIV PANIC
The U.S. residential mortgage market—and thus all the securities
based on it—began showing signs of stress in the spring of 2007. Some
subprime mortgage originators had already failed under the stress of
putback claims from investors.246 But the scope of the subprime mortgage
problem only became clear on Wall Street in June 2007 when two Bear
Stearns-sponsored hedge funds displayed signs of distress.247 Both were
invested in assets very similar to SIV-lites, including large exposures to
U.S. subprime mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and CDOs.
Bear Stearns attempted to bail out the healthier fund by extending it a
$1.6 billion collateralized repo line of credit,248 in order to buy the fund
time to recover. Bear did not extend funding to the other fund, and by mid245. TABE, supra note 219, at 136–38.
246. Ownit Mortgage Solutions filed for bankruptcy in December 2006; Mortgage Lenders
Network USA filed for bankruptcy in January 2007. Worth Civilis & Mark Gongloff, Subprime
Shakeout: Lenders That Have Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL. ST. J. ONLINE,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html (last visited Apr.
22, 2013). New Century Financial filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007. Julie Creswell, Mortgage
Lender New Century Financial Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/business/worldbusiness/02iht-loans.5.5118838.html?_r=0. Other
subprime lenders simply shut down operations without filing for bankruptcy. Civilis & Gongloff, supra.
247. These two funds, the High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Leveraged Fund and the HighGrade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund, were the focus of early SEC financial
crisis litigation. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (No.
08CV02457), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2008/comp20625.pdf.
248. Letter from Bear Stearns to hedge fund clients (July 17, 2007),
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ071707_Bear_Stearns_Co.pdf [hereinafter Bear
Stearns Client Letter]. Originally, Bear Stearns indicated it that it would provide $3.2 billion in funding.
Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, $3.2 Billion Move by Bear Stearns to Rescue Fund, N.Y. TIMES, June 23,
2007, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/23/business/23bond.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
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July, Bear announced that it would seek an “orderly wind down” for both
funds.249 Both funds lost almost all their value,250 and their failure spooked
the market regarding anything invested in subprime mortgage markets. The
market was further unnerved when credit rating agencies Moody’s and
Standard & Poor’s downgraded hundreds of MBS on July 10, 2007.
Commercial paper investors such as money market funds refused to roll
over the paper of the SIV-lites and a run ensued.251
Absent a rollover, the SIV-lites had to sell assets. Unfortunately, the
run occurred, not coincidentally, at the very time the assets’ market value
was falling because of the ratings downgrades, making it harder for the
SIV-lites to generate liquidity by selling their assets. As the SIVs
conducted a mass fire sale of their MBS and CDO securities they drove
down their prices still further.252 Two SIV-lites failed by mid-August,253
their notes having been dramatically downgraded directly from AAA to
CCC.254 The precipitous downgrade set off a full-blown stampede from
anything with the SIV label.255 As one investor noted, “This is an
environment where there has been a big loss of confidence and nobody is
distinguishing between apples and oranges.”256
Many of the SIVs were taken back onto their sponsor’s balance sheets,
despite the absence of any legal obligation to do so.257 The sponsors were
249. Bear Stearns Client Letter, supra note 248.
250. Id.; Kate Kelly, Serena Ng & Michael Hudson, Subprime Uncertainty Fans Out, WALL ST. J.
(July 18, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118470713201469384.html.
251. Credit Suisse’s Institutional Money Market Fund’s Prime portfolio alone withdrew almost $9
billion in funding from the SIV sector between June and October 2007. TABE, supra note 219, at 10–11.
252. Paul J. Davies, SIV-lite Sector Raises Fresh Credit Concerns, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 21, 2007,
10:55 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d8ea9a64-5019-11dc-a6b0-0000779fd2ac.html#
axzz2R2n3YcTx.
253. TABE, supra note 219, at 11.
254. David Henry, Anatomy of a Ratings Downgrade, BUS. WK. (Sept. 30, 2007),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2007-09-30/anatomy-of-a-ratings-downgrade.
255. The panic spread from SIV-lites to SIVs proper with the collapse of Rhineland Funding, a
SIV sponsored by the German bank IKB. Rhineland had nearly $27.3 billion in commercial paper notes
outstanding in July of 2007. Davies, supra note 253; Gillian Tett, Paul J. Davies & Norma Cohen,
Structured Investment Vehicles’ Role In Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2007, 7:28 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8eebf016-48fd-11dc-b326-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz2QybYEltv.
Its
commercial paper investors refused to roll over some of the notes, and IKB refused to provide a credit
line because it was itself experiencing a liquidity crunch, in part related to the failure of Sachsen
Funding, a $7 billion SIV-lite IKB sponsored. Tett, Davies & Cohen, supra. The panic then spread to
Cheyne Capital’s Cheyne Finance SIV. Harald Berlinkicke, Subprime Contagion, RISK, Sept. 2007, at
105, 106, available at http://www.risk.net/data/risk/pdf/articles/2007/105-107_Risk_0907.pdf.
256. Tett, Davies & Cohen, supra note 255.
257. See, e.g., Michael Connolly, HSBC’s SIV Bailout May Increase Pressure on Other Banks,
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2007), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119612785731704755.html (noting that
HSBC took $45 billion in SIV assets onto its balance sheet); Aaron Kirchfeld & Neil Unmack,
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often obligated to provide liquidity puts, but rarely for the full value of the
SIVs’ assets. The banks provided liquidity nonetheless, assuming the SIVs’
debt as they attempted to protect their reputational capital and damper
distress in the market, perhaps fearing that fire-sale prices would create low
marks for their own mark-to-market assets, forcing them to raise more
capital.
In the end, none of the six-SIV-lites or 28 SIVs in existence in July
2007 survived; the last SIV, Sigma Finance, failed in October 2008.258 In
little over a year, all of the SIVs and SIV-lites were either put into
insolvency proceedings or taken back onto their sponsors’ balance sheets.
A $400 billion sector of the financial services industry had disappeared, but
with little public outcry or understanding.
C. REVENGE OF THE SIV: THE NON-SCANDAL
The SIV collapse is the scandal that wasn’t. The scandal lay not in the
fact of financial collapse—that reran the classic fact pattern of assetliability duration mismatch and panic. The scandal lay partly in the
accounting and regulatory capital treatment: What were these multibillion
liabilities doing off of the banks’ balance sheets? The scandal also lay in
the sponsors’ reactions: Since when is it a bank’s business to bail out
exposed creditors of a separate entity? If the SIVs were the truly
independent entities the banks had claimed them to be for accounting and
regulatory purposes, the banks would never have assumed their liabilities.
It can be argued that the SIV rescue followed from reasonable
business judgments. For sponsors the move made sense because of
reputational risks that were real even if there was really not supposed to be
any recourse, and banks with their own subprime MBS exposure may have
Dresdner Rescues $19 Billion SIV, Follows Citigroup, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2008),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arZ_ycdFEkRk&refer=home
(noting
that Dresdner Bank AG took $18.8 billion in SIV assets on balance sheet and a total of $140 billion in
SIV assets taken back on other banks’ balance sheets); Parmy Olson, Barclays Bails Out Avendis Fund,
FORBES.COM (Sept. 12, 2007, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/09/12/barclays-golden-keymarkets-equity-cx_po_0912markets08.html (noting that Barclays had bailed out four SIV-lites it had
sponsored, paying one-hundred cents on the dollar despite only being obligated to pay twenty-five cents
on the dollar); Neil Unmack & Doug Alexander, Bank of Montreal Raises SIV Bailout to $12.7 Billion,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2008, 4:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&
sid=aJzO9pEcoL5w; David Wighton, Citi Launches $49bn SIV Rescue, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2007),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6626b45e-a9dd-11dc-aa8b-0000779fd2ac.html (noting that Citigroup
took $49 billion in SIV assets on balance sheet).
258. TABE, supra note 219, at 6. Gwen Robinson, Sigma Collapse Marks End of SIV Era, FT
ALPHAVILLE (Oct. 2, 2008), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2008/10/02/16576/sigma-collapse-marksend-of-siv-era/.
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been desperate to avoid low marks from fire sales that would force them to
raise capital to meet Basel ratios. For SIV managers, the sponsor bank
buyout was the best deal they could get. Yet, the unavoidable fact is that
the whole SIV game was founded on the benefits of implicit recourse even
as the SIVs were held forth to the world as standalone entities and were
regulated (or more precisely not regulated) as such.
Given that, were the SIVs properly omitted from the banks’ balance
sheets? It is a nice question. The answer depends on one’s reading of FIN
46(R). Consider a hypothetical SIV, financed 90 percent with medium-term
notes and asset-backed commercial paper and 10 percent with subordinated
notes split fifty-fifty between the sponsoring bank and a hedge fund. The
trivial equity interest is in a charitable trust. Finally, there is an implicit
guarantee.
We will first read FIN 46(R) to require consolidation. The implicit
guarantee is supposed to be put on the table for purposes of determining the
appropriate accounting treatment; under FIN 46(R), implicit guarantees
should be taken into account as variable interests.259 Since the guarantee
potentially puts the bank on the hook for the entire risk of the SIV, the bank
absorbs a majority of the economic risk of the entity and arguably should
be deemed the “primary beneficiary.”260 Under FIN 46(R) consolidation
with the sponsor’s financial statements is the result.261 Of course, the nature
of an implicit guarantee is that it is implicit—the guarantee does not exist
until it is acted upon. This makes it more than a little awkward to include it
in an accounting treatment.
Now let us try a different reading of FIN 46(R) under which the bank
would not be the primary beneficiary as of the time the SIV was set up.
Under FIN 46(R), a VIE’s “expected loss” is not determined as a matter of
hypothetical exposure on an extreme downside. It instead follows from a
present valuation of the entity’s expected cash flows.262 In other words,
FIN 46(R) looks at the likely, rather than potential losses. Given the
assumptions inherent in AAA-rated assets, such a valuation would project
only a small likelihood of loss. For the above bank, a trivial expected loss
259. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 213, at 74; IMPLICIT VARIABLE INTERESTS UNDER
FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46, Staff Position No. FIN 46(R)-5, at 1 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2005).
260. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 213, at 12.
261. Id. at 11. A question does arise: What does it mean to bring an “implicit” guaranty into an
accounting determination? It would seem that so doing would transform implicit into explicit and with
it the nature of the obligation. “Implicit” leaves the bank the option to walk away; “explicit” invites
reliance and binding obligation.
262. EPSTEIN, NACH & BRAGG, supra note 207, at 684–85.
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would be completely soaked up by the subordinated notes. So long as the
bank did not hold more than 50 percent of the notes, it would not be on the
hook for a majority of the loss and would not be the principal beneficiary.
Later deterioration in asset values did not reverse the treatment: FIN 46(R)
did not require periodic updating of valuation assumptions. Note that under
this reading, it would make no difference whether the guarantee was
implicit or explicit.
Actual bank disclosures were consistent with the second
interpretation. They make for strange reading today. For example, Citibank,
in its 2006 financial statements, reported in a footnote that it had $227.8
billion in unconsolidated VIE assets.263 It added the following:
The Company may be a party to derivative contracts with VIEs, may
provide loss enhancement in the form of letters of credit and other
guarantees to the VIEs, may be the investment manager, and may also
have an ownership interest in certain VIEs. Although actual losses are
not expected to be material, the Company’s maximum exposure to loss
as a result of its involvement with VIEs that are not consolidated was
$109 billion . . . .264

The $109 billion presumably regarded only the “explicit” guarantees.
In any event, it seems to us that a $109 billion exposure is a little too large
to be popped off without further explanation in a footnote.
Yet the SIV episode prompted no enforcement actions concerning bad
accounting treatments or audit failure, although there certainly was
criticism once the red ink started to flow.265 By hypothesis, either the
implicit guarantees were deemed appropriately left off the table when the
accounting treatment was determined, or low risk of loss valuations made
all guarantees irrelevant for accounting treatment purposes.
Significantly, the FASB significantly amended FIN 46(R) in the 2009
263. Citigroup Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 147 (Feb. 23, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831001/000119312507038505/d10k.htm#fin49490_57.
264. Id. See also Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 132 (Feb. 28, 2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/70858/000119312507042036/d10k.htm
(explaining that Bank of America had $51.9 billion of assets in unconsolidated VIEs, and its total
maximum loss exposure for these VIEs was $46 billion); SunTrust Banks, Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 48 (Mar. 1, 2007) available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/750556/
000119312507043429/d10k.htm (explaining that SunTrust had $2.2 billion of assets in unconsolidated
VIEs, and its total maximum loss exposure for these VIEs was $32.2 million).
265. See Jonathan Weil, Citigroup SIV Accounting Looks Tough to Defend, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24,
2007, 12:13 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6dgIOAfMIrI
(criticizing Citigroup’s accounting analysis).
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Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 167.266 The new rule,
which flows through to bank capital regulation,267 recasts the primary
beneficiary inquiry, emphasizing the power to direct the activities that
“most significantly impact the entity’s economic performance,”268 in
addition to the majority risk of loss. The effect is to make it more likely
that a sponsor that enters into a management contract with an SPE will be
deemed the primary beneficiary, particularly if the contract includes
performance-based compensation. Additionally, quantitative analysis is to
be displaced by a qualitative approach.269 In other words, primary
beneficiary status is no longer determined by loss percentage numbers.
Finally, a sponsor’s status must be reconsidered on a going concern basis,
and financial distress can trigger a change in treatment.270 Apply these
factors, and the SIVs would have been consolidated.271
D. ENRON REDUX?
Enron and the SIV collapse certainly are distinguishable: scandal in
the former case, no scandal in the latter. Enron was self-consciously
shunting junk assets away from itself, doing everything it could to
construct transactions that pumped its earnings in the process. The banks
that set up SIVs apparently thought in good faith that an AAA credit rating
implied safety and soundness. Enron also pushed the accounting rules
much harder than did the banks, and when it all came tumbling down,
Enron resorted to concealment.
But the benefit of hindsight permits us to identify core properties in
common. Both cases involved sales to captive entities that turned out to be
266. AMENDMENTS TO FASB INTERPRETATION NO. 46(R), Statement of Fin. Accounting
Standards No. 167 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) [hereinafter SFAS 167].
267. See 12 C.F.R., pt. 3, app. A., § 3(a)(6) (2009) (requiring banks to maintain risk-based capital
based on consolidation of VIEs if consolidation is required for accounting purposes by GAAP); 12
C.F.R. § 3.4(b) (2009) (reserving the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s right to require a bank
to treat exposures as if they were on balance sheet for regulatory capital purposes); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app.
A, § 5 (2009) (optional transition rules for SFAS 167 for VIEs); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. C, pt. V, § 41
(2009) (incorporating GAAP sale treatment for determination of whether risk-based capital must be
held against securitized assets for internal ratings-based and advanced measurement approaches under
Basel II); 12 C.F.R. pt. 3, app. C, pt. X, § 81 (2009) (optional transition rules for SFAS 167 for internal
ratings-based and advanced measurement approaches under Basel II).
268. SFAS 167, supra note 266, at 7.
269. Id. at 3 (“Judgment, based on consideration of all the facts and circumstances, is needed to
distinguish substantive terms, transactions, and arrangements from nonsubstantive terms, transactions,
and arrangements.”).
270. Id. at 6 (discussing events that could trigger a change in treatment).
271. The FASB’s examples in SFAS 167 make this abundantly clear. Id. at 32–39 (examples 3
and 4).
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shams when the chips were down. In both cases the SPEs were ticking time
bombs, and their detonation had materially negative consequences for the
sponsors’ financial statements. In both cases, the structures were set up on
the overly optimistic assumption that highly regarded assets, whether
Enron stock or subprime CDOs, always retain their value. Risk was
formally transferred but in substance never left the sponsor. Form overtook
substance. The accounting standards were gamed in both cases, and the
FASB reacted in exactly the same way, taking the occasion to redraft the
standards to assure that the events in question do not recur.
VI. THE RIGHTFUL HEIR: GOLDMAN SACHS’S SYNTHETIC CDOS
On July 15, 2010, Goldman agreed to pay a record penalty of $550
million to the SEC to settle securities fraud charges arising from a synthetic
CDO transaction known as ABACUS 2007-AC1.272 The nub of the SEC’s
complaint was that Goldman, as placement agent for the SPE’s notes, had
told investors that the CDO’s assets were chosen by an independent agent
when a hedge fund that was short on the assets had in fact played a
“significant role” in the selection.273
The ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction became the leading symbol of
Wall Street excess during the housing bubble.274 The deal was structurally
generic and unremarkable among synthetic CDOs. ABACUS 2007-AC1
was one of forty-seven synthetic CDOs that Goldman did between 2004
and 2007.275 Other banks did similar deals; Citibank has agreed to settle a
similar enforcement action for $285 million, although the district court
refused to approve the settlement on the basis of the agreed-upon factual
record.276
272. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges
Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2010/2010-123.htm [hereinafter SEC Goldman Settlement Release].
273. Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No.
1:10CV3229), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf
[hereinafter SEC Goldman Complaint].
274. Goldman also had to deal with an enforcement action by the UK Financial Services
Authority, which charged that Goldman had failed to inform the FSA that Fabrice Tourre, a Goldman
employee, received a Wells notice from the SEC, which indicated that SEC was going to bring an
enforcement action against him. Chris V. Nicholson, F.S.A. Fines Goldman over ABACUS
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Sept. 9, 2010, 3:14 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/09/
09/goldman-sachs-said-to-be-fined-30-9-million-in-britain. Goldman was required to inform the UK
Financial Services Authority about the Wells notice, but did not do so until seven months after the
notice was issued. Id.
275. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 145.
276. The settlement was announced on October 19, 2011 and involved a $1 billion hybrid cashsynthetic CDO called Class V Funding III. Press Release, SEC, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle
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As a matter of transaction structure, ABACUS was a Bistro replay, but
with a twist. Bistro, along with First Executive and Enron, involved captive
entities created to enable contracts that dodged regulatory or accounting
requirements applied to actual portfolios of securities. The CDSs
securitized in Bistro were being used to hedge Morgan’s existing exposure.
In contrast, the CDSs in ABACUS were not undertaken to hedge
Goldman’s existing exposures. Instead, they were “naked” CDSs, in which
the protection buyer has no “insurable interest” in the reference assets. The
CDSs in ABACUS were not hedges, but pure gambles on the reference
assets’ performance. This means that none of the parties to the ABACUS
transaction actually owned the referenced securities. Instead, the reference
portfolio was hypothetical, constructed for the occasion out of the universe
of existing debt obligations. It was just a list of debt securities. Synthetic
CDOs like ABACUS had moved beyond asset light and dispensed with
assets entirely.
Given a list of securities, bets can be placed on its performance, much
as a bookie takes bets on the outcome of a sporting event. The Bistro
structure provides a vehicle particularly well suited for this purpose. Recall
that the SPE enters into a credit default swap in which it is the protection
seller. The SPE funds itself by issuing credit-linked notes (“CLNs”). The
holders of the CLNs issued by the SPE in effect bet that that the referenced
securities will not default. Given that outcome, their notes pay handsomely.
The counterparty to the SPE’s credit default swap bets that the referenced
obligations will default. Given that outcome, it makes a killing, while the
holders of the CLNs get stuck with a nonperforming investment. Figure 5
summarizes.

SEC Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm. The SEC said Citigroup set up the CDO to
hedge a proprietary position, rather than acting as a dealer between the CLN investors and a third-party
short, and failed to disclose that it was using the CDO as a hedge, rather than as a dealer. Id. The
settlement was not approved by the district court because it wanted a more robust factual basis for
determining the fairness of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328,
335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the trial in the district court pending
appeal of the rejection of the settlement. SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 169 (2d
Cir. 2012). Separately, Citigroup banker Brian Stoker was acquitted in a jury trial for his alleged
securities violations in the sale of the CDO. Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, Loss in Citi Case Deals
Blow to U.S., WALL. ST. J., July 31, 2012, at C3, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10000872396390444860104577561380191553796.html.

2013]

TRANSACTIONAL GENEALOGY OF SCANDAL

849

FIGURE 5. Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligations (Synthetic CDOs)

Goldman and the other banks viewed these structures as a source of
new inventory for their armies of dealers. While a synthetic CDO occasions
no new investment in producing assets, it does occasion the brokering of
arm’s-length risk trades between willing long and short investors. From
Goldman’s perspective, the ABACUS transaction was nothing more than
putting together matched sets of contracts and making a spread, a normal
derivatives dealer operation.
But for the catastrophic losses on the deal following from the
subprime mortgage market’s collapse, no one would have cared. But when
the deal performed dismally, Goldman found that not everyone accepted its
dealer-based framing. A synthetic CDO is not just a swap. It is a swap with
an SPE “sponsored” by Goldman that was created to issue debt securities.
When a traditional operating company sells its own securities, it is not
viewed as an arm’s-length contract seller. A massive regulatory apparatus
is there to make sure it tells the truth about itself. It certainly can be argued
that a sale by an SPE in a structured transaction is different and should be
viewed contractually, particularly in view of the fact that the securities are
privately placed. But this is ambiguous, uncharted territory. Thus did
Goldman stumble into a securities law infraction in the position of a
securities issuer with disclosure duties to its purchasers rather than as a
dealer in a freewheeling world of caveat emptor. Dealers that manufacture
their own securities inventories start to look like issuers.
A. THE ABACUS 2007-AC1 TRANSACTION
Goldman created ABACUS 2007-AC1 at the request of Paulson &
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Co., a hedge fund to which Goldman provided prime brokerage services, an
important source of Goldman’s revenue.277 Paulson had previously gone to
at least one other investment bank—Bear Stearns—with the request to
create the CDO, but was refused.278
Paulson’s motivation for pursuing the deal was a belief that mortgage
default rates were going to soar. Accordingly, Paulson was looking for
ways to be short on mortgages. Mortgages, however, cannot be shorted
directly, as they rarely, if ever, trade.279 A mortgage-backed security
(“MBS”), however, can be shorted by taking a derivative short position
using a credit default swap with the MBS as the reference asset.
Paulson wanted to take a short position on MBS using a CDS. As we
have seen, a CDS requires two parties: a short, known as the protection
buyer, and a long, known as the protection seller. Goldman agreed to sell
protection to Paulson only if it could enter into a closely matched set of
swaps with a third-party in order to hedge its exposure.280 In effect,
Goldman was looking to act as a swap dealer, selling protection to Paulson
out of one pocket while buying it from another party out of the other
pocket, a very typical arrangement in the swaps market.281
1. The SPE
That third-party protection seller was to be the ABACUS 2007-AC1, a
synthetic CDO that Goldman created for the purpose of marketing the long
277. WILLIAM D. COHAN, MONEY AND POWER: HOW GOLDMAN SACHS CAME TO RULE THE
WORLD 489–90 (2011).
278. Complaint at 8, ACA Fin. Guaranty Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/11, 2012
N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012), available at https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/
fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=Npp7667JRe2pWxCEf63SUw==&system=prod
[hereinafter ACA Goldman Complaint] (“At least one investment bank that Paulson approached before
approaching Goldman Sachs declined to assist Paulson out of concern for its reputation. Scott Eichel of
Bear Stearns, who reportedly met with Paulson several times, has been quoted as saying that Paulson
wanted: ‘especially ugly mortgages for the CDOs, like a bettor asking a football owner to bench a star
quarterback to improve the odds of his wager against the team.’ According to Eichel, such a transaction
‘didn’t pass [Bear’s] ethics standards; it was a reputation issue, and it didn’t pass our moral compass.
We didn’t think we should sell deals that someone else was shorting on the other side.’” (alteration in
original)).
279. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177,
1242 (2012).
280. See Submission on Behalf of Goldman, Sachs & Co. at 11, In re ABACUS CDO, No. HO10911 (Sept. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Goldman SEC Submission], available at
http://av.r.ftdata.co.uk/files/2010/04/Goldman-defence-doc-Part-I.pdf (explaining how Goldman
structured two transactions to minimize its risk).
281. See JOSEPH CILIA, FED. RESERVE BANK OF CHI., ASSET SWAPS: CREATING SYNTHETIC
INSTRUMENTS 13 (1996) (illustrating Merrill Lynch’s STEERS deal, showing Merrill as the SPE’s
original swap counterparty swapping out its risk with a third party).
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position on a swap that matched its swap with Paulson. Goldman’s
synthetic CDO followed the Bistro template. The promoter, here Goldman,
creates an SPE that funds itself by selling CLNs. The SPE, backed by the
proceeds of the sale of the notes, enters into a CDS as protection seller. The
CDS references a portfolio of securities, in this case MBS. The SPE invests
the proceeds from the sale of the notes in AAA-collateral, typically
Treasuries. The interest on the Treasuries together with the premiums on
the CDS flow through to the note holders as interest (and also pay the
SPE’s expenses). In the event of a default on the reference portfolio, the
Treasuries in the SPE are liquidated to pay the protection buyer. The note
holders take the loss.
Formally, ABACUS 2007-AC1 was a Delaware corporation and the
wholly-owned subsidiary of a Cayman Island limited liability company.282
Its assets were securities purchased with the proceeds of its credit-linked
notes and the right to premiums on CDS on a $2 billion portfolio comprised
of ninety reference assets.283 No asset substitution was allowed.284 The
reference portfolio consisted solely of subprime or midprime MBS rated
Baa2 by Moody’s.285 The reference portfolio was also diversified in terms
of issuers, tranches, and servicers.286
282. GOLDMAN SACHS, ABACUS 2007-AC1: $2 BILLION SYNTHETIC CDO REFERENCING A
STATIC RMBS PORTFOLIO SELECTED BY ACA MANAGEMENT, LLC 19 (2007) [hereinafter ABACUS
FLIPBOOK], available at http://www.math.nyu.edu/faculty/avellane/ABACUS.pdf. The Delaware coissuer was necessary to make the CLNs marketable to U.S. insurers, which are sometimes restricted in
their ability to invest in foreign issuers’ obligations. DOUGLAS J. LUCAS, LAURIE S. GOODMAN &
FRANK J FABIOZZI, COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: STRUCTURES AND ANALYSIS 14 (2d ed.
2006). See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-102c(d) (2012) (limited investments in foreign-issued
obligations); N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405 (McKinney 2006) (permitting only limited investments in foreignissued obligations). CDOs are based in low-tax foreign locales like the Cayman Islands, Ireland,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. See Donald Gray Carden & Zey Nasser, U.S. Tax Operating
Guidelines for CDO Transactions, in DEUTSCHE BANK, GLOBAL SECURITIZATION AND STRUCTURED
FINANCE 2007, at 120 (2007), available at http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/07_americas/DB07_
120_127_US_CC.pdf (describing the importance of avoiding U.S. corporate tax). This is critical in
order to avoid entity-level U.S. taxation. Whereas RMBS and CMBS can obtain pass-through U.S. tax
status if they qualify as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) under 26 U.S.C.
§ 860A–G (2006), CDOs do not qualify as REMICs unless they hold solely untranched mortgage passthrough certificates. CDOs avoid U.S. entity-level taxation by being foreign issued, as merely investing
and holding U.S. securities is not considered as being engaged in business or activity in the United
States, which would subject the CDO to U.S. taxation. Carden & Nasser, supra, at 123.
283. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 11–12.
284. Id. at 12.
285. Id. at 11.
286. Id. at 12. None of the assets were themselves CDOs or RMBS backed by option ARMs. Id.
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2. The Credit-Linked Notes
Recall that in Bistro only a part of the risk on the reference portfolio
was covered by the CDS with the SPE. It was the same with ABACUS. To
illustrate, if the SPE does not sell its most junior tranches of CLNs,
tranches comprising 10 percent of the possible notes that might be issued,
the SPE would not write CDS protection on the first 10 percent of the
losses in the reference portfolio; the wager is only on losses above 10
percent, much like a wager on who will finish in the top three in a race,
rather than on the order of finish of the complete field. The unsold (and
unoffered) tranches of CLNs are ghost tranches with only a notional
existence. Flexibility results: synthetic CDOs allow sponsors to tailor risks
to the specific demands of their investors’ portfolio managers.
So, even as ABACUS referenced a $2 billion portfolio, the SPE did
not actually write $2 billion of protection. Instead, it only wrote protection
for the losses between 21 and 44 percent,287 and then only to the extent it
sold the tranches of CLNs in that range. With Goldman acting as placement
agent for a private placement under Rule 144A,288 ABACUS sold slightly
over half of the CLNs for the bottom 21–34 percent range of its capital
structure (class A-2) and a quarter of the CLN for the 35–44 percent range
(class A-1).
The buyers were IKB, a German bank, which purchased all $50
million of class A-1 notes and $100 million of the class A-2 notes. ACA
Capital Management, LLC, which also acted as the portfolio selection
agent, purchased $42 million of class A-2 notes.289
Thus, if the $2 billion reference portfolio incurred losses of less than
$420 million (21 percent), ABACUS would not be obligated to pay out on
the CDS. If the losses exceeded $420 million, however, ABACUS would
have to pay on the CDS, but would not be liable for losses on the portfolio
beyond $880 million (44%). Based on the principal amount of CLNs
actually sold, ABACUS was liable for just over half of the portfolio’s
losses between $420 and $700 million (21–34 percent) or up to $142
million, and for a quarter of the portfolio’s losses between $700 and $880
million (35–44 percent) or up to $50 million. As to these losses, IKB and
ACA bore the risk.
287. We assume, but are not sure, that losses were calculated on the net portfolio, rather than on
an individual reference asset basis.
288. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 11.
289. It purchased for itself and three CDOs it managed. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note
278, at 16.
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3. The Credit Default Swap and the Portfolio Selection Agent
We turn now to the ABACUS CDS. The direct protection buyer from
the SPE was not Paulson, but Goldman; Paulson was not mentioned in the
offering documents. As with Morgan and Bistro, Goldman was swapping
with its own SPE. Yet because of Paulson’s subsequent matched swaps
with Goldman,290 Paulson, rather than Goldman, was economically the
short party in interest, just as the CLN holders were economically the real
long parties in interest. The press has made much of Goldman’s place as
initial swap counterparty.291 But it was not an unusual arrangement. Many
CDO sponsors, such as Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley, did their
synthetic CDOs this way.292 There was a business justification: with the
sponsor on the hook on the swap directly, the CLNs benefitted from the
sponsor’s credit rating regarding the certainty of the stream of premiums on
the CDS; Goldman was a safer counterparty than Paulson.
Indeed, it was not even necessarily problematic for the synthetic
CDO’s sponsor to be the short as an economic proposition, so long as the
reference assets were selected independently or negotiated at arm’s length
between the short and long interests. And such was the practice. Before the
promoter took a synthetic CDO to market, it designated an entity, the
“portfolio selection agent” to negotiate the selection of the issues in the
reference portfolio on behalf of the yet-to-exist CLN investors. For
ABACUS 2007-AC1, the portfolio selection agent was ACA Capital
Management, LLC, which would also be a note purchaser. ACA Capital
Management was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a monoline bond insurance
company, ACA Financial Guaranty Corp., which also managed assets like
CDOs.293 ACA was supposedly incentivized to take care in portfolio
selection because it received a percentage fee on each tranche, with larger
fees for more junior tranches.294 As ABACUS 2007-AC1 was not an
actively managed CDO, ACA’s involvement was therefore limited to
290. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 11.
291. E.g., Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Debt, Bet Against It and Won,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/24/business/
24trading.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Goldman also entered into an interest rate swap and a liquidity
put provision with the CDO. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 15, 50.
292. Morgenson & Story, supra note 291.
293. For purposes of this discussion the distinction between the entities in the ACA family is
immaterial and both will be referred to as ACA.
294. ABACUS FLIPBOOK, supra note 282, at 27 (“A portion of management fees are subordinated
and performance based.”). It is not clear if ACA collected management fees on unissued CLNs based
solely on the performance of the reference portfolio. If so, then the functional management fee was
substantially higher than stated and partially subordinated to the issued CLNs.
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selecting the reference assets for the swap.295 After the initial selection,
ACA’s role as portfolio selection agent was over.
4. The Super Senior Swaps
Recall that the “super senior” tranche of the CDO created a sticking
point when Morgan constructed Bistro.296 No super senior credit-linked
notes could be sold out of the SPE, for the arithmetic did not work out. The
yields on any super senior notes just would not have been competitive. To
get the Fed to sign off on the deal, Morgan had to find an investment grade
CDS counterparty to sell unfunded protection on the super senior credit risk
of the reference portfolio and found that counterparty in AIG.
When we fast-forward to synthetic CDOs, we find that a super senior
CDS also has become strictly optional. As no one is looking to the
synthetic structure for regulatory capital relief,297 super senior comes into
the deal only because someone wants to make a super-senior bet. As it
happened, Paulson did. Thus Goldman entered into a CDS with Paulson
covering losses on the ABACUS reference portfolio across the loss range
from 21–100 percent. Goldman’s swap with the ABACUS SPE covered
21–45 percent of the range. That left the remaining 45–100 percent of
exposure—the super senior—to be shifted away from Goldman via a
matched swap with a third party. ACA proved willing to be the
counterparty on the reference portfolio range from 50–100 percent—a
nearly $1 billion super-senior commitment.298 As with Bistro, this super
senior CDS was entered into on the side, directly between the parties rather
than with the SPE. Note that the swap with ACA didn’t quite go the
distance, covering 50–100 percent but leaving Goldman an unhedged long
on the 45–49 percent band, a $100 million exposure.299
The swap left Goldman relying on ACA’s creditworthiness as a
counterparty to the tune of $1 billion. Goldman was not comfortable with
ACA and so recruited the Dutch bank ABN Amro to serve as a swap
intermediary.300 ABN Amro entered the swap on the 50–100 percent slice
295. The CDO’s operations—namely providing investors with reporting and collecting and
disbursing funds, were handled by LaSalle Bank NA, in its capacities as indenture trustee, note
calculation agent, and payment agent. Id. at 19.
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. IKB, the German bank that purchased the CLNs, was looking for low-risk weighted assets
with high returns.
298. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 14.
299. See id. (describing how ABN Amro entered into a CDS with ACA, agreeing to be liable for
its risk in the deal.)
300. Id.
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of the reference portfolio with Goldman and into a matched set of swaps
with ACA on which it took a spread for intermediating.301 If ABN Amro
had to pay out on the swap it would turn around and look to be made whole
by ACA, which economically was the ultimate long on the senior half of
the reference portfolio risk. ABN Amro also seems to have had some
concerns about ACA, for it followed up the matched swaps by taking out
$27 million in corporate CDS protection on ACA from Goldman. 302 Figure
6 summarizes the critical parts of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transactions.
FIGURE 6. Complete ABACUS 2007-AC1 Transaction (elements not
disclosed in dashes)

B. THE HITCH
Let us put ourselves in the position of a client who goes to the
Goldman swap desk looking to sell credit protection. It enters into a swap
301. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 14–15, 19.
302. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 14 n.3 (noting that the CDS entitled ABN to
payment if ACA’s credit rating fell below a certain level). ACA was to receive a $4.5 million annual
premium on the swap from ABN Amro. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 15.
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with Goldman as the short, fully expecting that the swap desk will then
hedge, seeking out a counterparty to enter into the short position on a
matched swap. Now let us put ourselves in the position of buyers of CLNs
from a synthetic CDO, the reference portfolio of which is selected by an
independent agent and the swap counterparty of which is Goldman. The
expectation about the swap desk and the third-party matched swap is
exactly the same. Indeed, Goldman would have no reason to sponsor the
CDO if it did not already have or fully expect to find such a swap
counterparty.303 In the world of derivatives, every long presupposes a short.
Indeed, Goldman swapped over its short risk starting with its first synthetic
CDO, ABACUS 2004-1,304 and the ABACUS 2007-AC1 investors had no
basis for assuming that Goldman would not hedge. Paulson (or the
equivalent) had to be there.
But packaging a synthetic CDO is more complicated than acting as
dealer matching conventional CDS sellers and buyers.305 With a synthetic,
the reference portfolio is the substance over which the buyers and sellers
trade risk. It is not a given; it must be created. Therein lay the problem with
ABACUS.
ACA was touted to investors as the “portfolio selection agent,” and
the ABACUS offering materials emphasized that there was an “Alignment
of Economic Interest” between ACA and the CLN holders based on ACA’s
compensation and investment.306 ACA’s name was used to sell the deal: an
internal Goldman email noted “we expect to leverage ACA’s credibility
and franchise to help distribute this Transaction.”307
Further, ACA did formally select the assets in the reference portfolio.
But Paulson also had input on the selection and seems to have vetoed the
inclusion of several reference securities.308 The result was that a party that
was economically short on the deal (and thus had every incentive to choose
303. There was the possibility, of course, that the promoter was hedging a proprietary position, as
was the case with Citigroup’s Class V Funding III CDO. See supra note 276 and accompanying text
(discussing the possibility that Citigroup set up a CDO as a hedge).
304. FCIC FINAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 143.
305. See Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323, 338–39 (2011) (observing how in synthetic
securitization “the dealer or market maker is no longer a neutral provider of inventory seeking to make
money on the spread. Rather, like a traditional underwriter, the dealer becomes a producer of a synthetic
inventory, selling incentives that will distort the neutral market maker function.”).
306. ABACUS Flipbook, supra note 282, at 11, 27.
307. Felix
Salmon,
Goldman’s
Abacus
Lies,
REUTERS
(Apr.
10,
2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/04/16/goldmans-abacus-lies/. Some communications went
from Paulson to Goldman and thence to ACA. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, ¶ 24.
308. Goldman SEC Submission, supra note 280, at 12–13.
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the junkiest assets in the class) had a voice in determining the economic
profile of the issuer of the securities sold in the deal. This fact was not
disclosed to the securities purchasers.
The omission was arguably material. Why otherwise would Goldman
make such a show of interposing a properly-incented independent
decisionmaker at the risk-return margin? But a strong counter argument can
be made. In this case the independent agent is not only an expert on the
asset class but a purchaser of CLNs from the SPE. If Paulson’s portfolio
choices were unacceptably risky, ACA presumably would have pushed
back. Finally, the other long parties were sophisticated debt investors and
understood that the deal had to be constructed so as to be satisfactory to a
short-side bettor, be it Goldman or some ultimate short.
Now let us thicken the plot: ACA knew that Paulson had its hand in,
although it is not clear if ACA knew the extent of Paulson’s input.309 At the
same time, ACA appears to have been misled about Paulson’s role in the
deal. ACA allegedly believed, based on representations from Goldman
employee Fabrice “Fab” Tourre, that Paulson was actually going to be
investing in the ABACUS notes, purchasing the most junior CLNs at the
first loss position of up to 10 percent.310 That would have made Paulson the
longest of the longs, rather than the short. Accordingly, ACA had no reason
to object to Paulson’s involvement, as it is common practice in structured
finance issuance for the buyer of the most junior or “equity” tranche to
have a say in portfolio selection.311 Because ACA believed Paulson was in
fact long, it did not think Paulson’s involvement in the asset selection was
unusual or contrary to its interest; nor, presumably, would the other
309. See id. (“There is no indication that ACA ‘rubber stamped’ any of the securities suggested by
Paulson, or that it behaved in any way inconsistent with the normal obligations of a Portfolio Selection
Agent.”).
310. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, at 13–15.
311. With RMBS and CMBS, the equity or “B-piece” investor has “kickout rights,” allowing it to
inspect and eliminate assets from a deal before sale. Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The
Commercial Real Estate Bubble, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1978264.
The infamous Magnetar deals also involved the equity investor selecting the synthetic CDO’s
assets. Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund Helped Keep the
Bubble Going, PROPUBLICA (Apr. 9, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/all-themagnetar-trade-how-one-hedge-fund-helped-keep-the-housing-bubble. In the Magnetar deals, the
Magnetar hedge fund’s equity investment (the junior tranche) was real, but the Magnetar hedge fund
was also short on the mezzanine tranches via CDS. Id. Magnetar used its privileged equity position to
urge the selection of assets that would cause losses not just to its junior tranche, but also to the
mezzanine tranches on which it was short. Id. The Magnetar’s purchase of the equity tranches was the
sacrificial lamb, the buy in for being able to select junk assets that it could then short. Id.
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ABACUS investors have objected.312
C. THE RECKONING
The ABACUS 2007-AC1 reference assets performed dismally, just as
Paulson had hoped. By the fall of 2007, 83 percent of them were in
default.313 By January 2008, 99 percent of the reference portfolio had been
downgraded, resulting in near total losses for ABACUS longs.314 The CLN
investors lost their investments.315 ABN Amro closed out its super senior
swap with Goldman by paying $841 million, which Goldman turned over
to Paulson on its matched swap.316 ABN Amro then turned to ACA for
payment on its matched swap, but ACA was by then insolvent.317 ABN
Amro, as a claimant in ACA’s insurance receivership, ended up with $15
million cash and some “surplus notes” of dubious value.318 Even Goldman
seems to have lost: it claimed a $100 million loss on the deal, which
matches its unhedged long position on the 45–49 percent level of the
reference portfolio.319
The SEC seemed to have been investigating the transaction as early as
August 2008.320 Why? The Enron precedent holds out an explanation: you
can spin structures, get lawyers and accountants to sign off on them, and
312. ACA seems to have recognized that the 0–9 percent CLN tranche never sold, but not to have
recognized the significance, namely that Paulson was not long. See Salmon, supra note 307 (observing
that ACA never intended to sell the 0–9 percent tranche).
313. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 18. See also Morgenson & Story, supra note
291 (reporting that by September 2007, “the ratings on 84 percent of the mortgages underlying [the
CDO] had been downgraded, indicating growing concerns about borrowers’ ability to repay the loans”).
314. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 18.
315. Except to the extent they had received payments prior to default.
316. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 19.
317. Cecile Gutscher & Christine Richard, ACA Agrees to Give Regulator Some Control Over
Unit, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 27, 2007), http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2007/12/aca-gives-control-toregulator-to-avert.html (noting that ACA agreed to give up control to regulators to avert bankruptcy).
318. ACA Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 20. Adding in ABN Amro’s CDS on ACA, it
seems that ABN Amro (and thus its interim purchaser, the Royal Bank of Scotland) lost $799 million
on the transaction, less the spread in protection payments made and received on the matched super
senior swaps.
319. Landon Thomas, Jr., A Routine Deal Became an $840 Million Mistake, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/business/23cdo.html?_r=0. It is not clear
what Goldman’s bottom line was net of fees (such as an upfront premium from Paulson). ACA
Goldman Complaint, supra note 278, at 10. Goldman may also have received pre-default CDS
premiums, including those from ABN Amro for the protection on ACA, and the payout on the CDS
protection sold to ABN Amro on ACA. Also, note that Goldman’s swap desk might have hedged its
ABACUS exposure.
320. Susanne Craig, Kara Scannell & Gregory Zuckerman, Firm Contends It Was Blindsided by
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2010, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240
52748703594404575192460560075600.html.
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line up blue chip financials as your counterparties, but no one ever pays
much attention until there’s red ink all over the table. Then they start
asking questions. The SEC finally filed suit against Goldman in April
2010.321 Goldman settled within three months for a record amount,322
having incurred considerable reputational damage from a deal on which it
may have lost money.
D. CONTRACT OR FIDUCIARY?
We are accustomed to thinking of companies that issue securities as
legal entities that act through agents—human beings who pull the strings
and are ultimately responsible for what the firm does. Viewed
contractually, a conventional producing corporation is a mix of explicit
contractual instructions and open-ended principal-agent relationships. The
gaps are filled in by governance institutions and fiduciary law.
Synthetic CDOs work differently, occupying a higher stage of
transactional evolutionary development. For all intents and purposes, the
ABACUS SPE is a firm without human agents.323 All functions are
performed by contract counterparties like indenture trustees and paying
agents, and the tasks they perform are ministerial, set out ex ante in
contractual instructions. Here, at last we encounter a gapless contractual
firm—the documentation provides complete instructions. ABACUS is, in
short, the apotheosis of the Jensen and Meckling “nexus of contracts” firm.
Let us view the ABACUS transaction, thus described, through
Goldman’s eyes. The advantage of the synthetic deal structure is its
facilitation of direct manufacture of products—swaps and notes—that can
be marketed by the Goldman sales force. And, despite the transactional
complexity, the product brought forth is relatively simple when compared
to debt securities issued by conventional operating companies. Even though
a conventional operating company’s debt contract is simpler than the
product’s, the analysis must still grapple with the factual complexity of the
company and its business; there will be inevitable opaque patches in its
profile. Accordingly, the bank that markets the conventional debt product
321. SEC Goldman Complaint, supra note 273, at 22.
322. SEC Goldman Settlement Release, supra note 272.
323. While the firm’s Delaware subsidiary presumably has a board of directors and its Cayman
LLC parent presumably has a managing member (or members), these managing actors have nothing to
manage and perform only formal functions. Cf. In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 482–83
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that SPE promoter breached fiduciary disclosure duties to Cayman-based
board of directors but that because the Cayman board was a rubber-stamp, actual disclosure would have
made no difference to the outcome).
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will have to invest in disclosure to ameliorate information asymmetries.
Assuming the debt is unrated, potential purchasers will also have to invest
in research and then go on to evaluate the debt against the yardstick of their
existing portfolios; the new debt may or may not fit.
A synthetic, in contrast, is more transparent—the assets are there on a
list for all to see, each rated by a credit rating agency. The autopilot
contractual instructions for the SPE eliminate most operational risk.324 The
issuing entity, moreover, can be tailored to the preexisting demands of
institutional debt portfolio managers. Goldman’s role is also different—it
goes out into the market and finds out what bets actors want to place and
then sets up the gambling table: step up and place your bet. If you don’t
like this bet, we’ll construct another one for you. The deal, viewed as a
whole, looks less like a long-term investment of capital than a collection of
arm’s-length one-off bets entered into at the swap desk—a series of
discrete contractual trades without fiduciary overtones.
Commentators concur, situating the ABACUS fact pattern in an
arm’s-length trading framework. The choice of strict contract as the frame
magnifies the policy implications of the SEC’s enforcement action. This
framework heralds a break in the traditional treatment of the relationship
between broker-dealers and customers, pushing it out of the contractual
sphere and into fiduciary territory.325
This is a legitimate reading of the case.326 Alternatively, it has been
noted that Goldman literally underwrote the ABACUS CLNs, buying them
from the SPE and reselling them to the purchasers. From this perspective,
Goldman is a gatekeeper with an information cost economizing role and a
reputational interest in assuring the accuracy of the issuer’s disclosures.327
Perhaps, but Goldman’s role here is more accurately characterized as the
CLNs’ placement agent.328 Goldman assumed no underwriting risk; this
324. See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1078, 1087 (2009)
(describing SPE immunity from bankruptcy and management discretion).
325. Steven M. Davidoff, Alan D. Morrison & William J. Willhelm, Jr., The SEC v. Goldman
Sachs: Reputation, Trust, and Fiduciary Duties in Investment Banking, 37 J. CORP. L. 529, 551–52
(2012); Onnig H. Dombalagian, Investment Recommendations and the Essence of Duty, 60 AM. U. L.
REV. 1265, 1270–71 (2011).
326. For a hypothetical application of later-to-be-enacted provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
prohibiting specified bank conflicts of interest to the ABACUS fact pattern, see Andrew F. Tuch,
Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs 49–53 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ., and Bus. Fellows' Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No. 37, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1809271.
327. Id. at 56–57.
328. The SEC complaint describes, but never labels, Goldman’s role in the transaction.
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was a private placement and Goldman would not have purchased the CLNs
(and indeed ABACUS would not have come into existence) had it not
already identified ready buyers.329
We would like to experiment with a third, narrower reading that
focuses on the facts of the case and the SPE structure. On the facts,
ABACUS is a straightforward fraud case lacking in paradigmatic
implications. It involves an affirmative representation—Fab Tourre’s
statement that Paulson would be taking the first loss tranche.330 There is
also a plausible defense: Goldman argues that between ACA’s own
sophistication and disclaimers in the documentation there was no basis for
reasonable reliance on the statement. There is in turn a plausible counter to
the defense—that Goldman concealed Paulson’s role in the deal, the true
nature of which was a fact exclusively in Goldman’s possession.331 The
case, thus stated, poses a choice between caveat emptor and self-reliance on
the one hand, and investor protection on the other. But the same choice is
implied by the facts of any good fraud case. Whatever the choice made
here, the law of fraud emerges in more or less the same shape, and the
playbook for Goldman and its agents need not be rewritten.
The case would be harder if Fab Tourre had kept his mouth shut. Then
the issue would be whether Goldman had an affirmative duty to disclose, a
duty that presupposes a fiduciary relationship, something that clearly does
not exist at the swap dealer’s desk or otherwise between stockbrokers and
their customers. Interpolating such a duty means taking a much bigger step
than finding an actionable fraud on the facts of the case. But a fundamental
realignment of broker-customer relationships would not need to be implied
if the duty arose as an incident of the sponsor-SPE relationship.
ABACUS, even as its actions were fully determined by a set of
contracts, was also a firm that issued securities. It was an issuer of a
particular sort, for it lacked human agents able to make representations
about itself and its securities. Indeed, ABACUS didn’t even exist at the
time the representations were made to ACA about Paulson’s involvement.
Even as the fraud was perpetrated through ABACUS, ABACUS was an
329. It is also questionable whether Goldman added an underwriter’s bonding function to the
transaction. Goldman’s brand and savior faire surely helped ABACUS obtain favorable credit ratings—
a type of indirect bonding—but the existence of ACA as portfolio selection agent suggests that there
were clear limits to any bonding value Goldman brought to the table in a transaction structured like
ABACUS.
330. SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 790 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
331. See ACA Fin. Guar. Corp. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 650027/11, 2012 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 1940, at *42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 23, 2012) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss in ACA’s
action against Goldman).
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empty shell incapable of perpetrating a fraud. It was a vehicle, not an actor.
Ergo, it is natural to look through ABACUS to Goldman as its progenitor.
Goldman created and controlled it; Goldman’s agents made representations
regarding it. Goldman accordingly was not just a dealer here; it had duties
to disclose as if it were the issuing entity.
The case for putting Goldman in the entity’s shoes strengthens when
we look at Fab Tourre’s misrepresentation. Fab seems to have lulled ACA
into complacency by portraying Paulson as a participant in a co-venture in
the entity’s equity. Accordingly, ACA and Goldman were not in the
position of one-off swap counterparties. Goldman sold the transaction to
ACA as an investment in a firm—a firm in which Paulson was investing
first loss, equity capital and so had an interest directly aligned with ACA’s.
Irrespective of whether Goldman made an affirmative misrepresentation or
simply failed to disabuse ACA of its misunderstanding, it was a material
deception, no different than if Goldman underwrote the common stock of
an operating company after knowingly choosing a CEO whose entire net
worth was staked on a short position in the company’s stock.
How strong is our theory doctrinally? It has indirect support in the
Southern District of New York’s Parmalat decision of 2010, in which an
SPE promoter was held to owe fiduciary duties to the SPE entity.332
Whether such a duty somehow flows through to the holders of the SPE’s
notes presents a question, but the inference arises. Another source of
indirect support comes from section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933333 and
section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,334 the control person
liability provisions. In the SEC’s interpretation of these sections, control
person liability attaches to actors with the power to direct the management
or policies of a primary violator of the securities laws, whether through
equity ownership, contract or otherwise.335 This bespeaks a substance-overform approach to fraud liability and Goldman certainly controlled
ABACUS. Unfortunately for our theory, liability presupposes a primary
violation by the ABACUS SPE, and any violation here originated with Fab
Tourre, Goldman’s own agent on the deal.
The closest analogies for our theory lie in doctrines that, much as does
accounting when it mandates consolidated reports, consolidate legal entities
for liability purposes. The corporate law of piercing the veil336 and
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

In re Parmalat Sec. Litig., 684 F. Supp. 2d 453, 479–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2006).
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2011) (providing the SEC interpretive definition of “control”).
See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8–9 (N.Y. 1966) (discussing the conditions
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bankruptcy consolidation337 are primary exemplars. Unfortunately for our
reading, the Supreme Court recently rejected a theory that posed treatment
of two closely related entities as one for federal securities law purposes. In
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,338 a plaintiff sought
to attach primary liability for a misstatement in a mutual fund prospectus to
the fund’s investment advisor. But for a placeholder board of directors at
the fund entity, the advisor entity ran the fund, including the drafting of
document issued in the fund’s name. Even so, the court took a form-oversubstance approach, ruling that the entity with “ultimate authority” over a
statement, here the fund, makes a statement for securities law purposes.339
The cases of Goldman and ABACUS can easily be distinguished from
the facts of Janus. But we take away a negative implication even so. The
days when the federal securities laws could be relied upon to cut through
layers of entities, ferret out a fraud’s economic motivations, and attach
liability appear to be over. So while scandal and financial disaster have
triggered an overhaul of the rules governing appearances, bringing SPEs
into the zone of accounting consolidation, the regime of financial
accountability remains impervious. It may even accord more respect to
entities like SPEs than heretofore.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE NATURE OF THE FIRM AND
REGULATION BY SCANDAL
Scandal presupposes defalcation, but defalcation does not necessarily
trigger scandal. The banks’ SIV accounting was clearly infirm, but the
resulting mess did not grow into scandal because the very act that was
scandalous, taking back the SIVs and thereby showing that they never had
really been independent, limited the immediate financial pain. Nor was
there any concealment; the regulators had signed off on SIV structures long
before. That the SIVs were a financial disaster, then, was not by itself a
under which courts may pierce the corporate veil).
337. See, e.g., In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 203–04 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting a standard for
determining when to apply the equitable doctrine of substantive consolidation, which permits a court to
“treat separate legal entities as if they were merged into a single survivor left with all the cumulative
assets and liabilities” (quoting In re Genesis Health Ventures, Inc., 402 F.3d 416, 423 (3d Cir. 2005))).
338. Janus Capital Group, Inc. v, First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2230–01 (2011).
339. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302. But see William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme Court’s Theory of the
Fund, 37 J. CORP. L. 771, 772 (2012) (criticizing the Janus decision); Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the
Regulation of Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2010) (arguing that mutual
funds should be conceived of as financial products rather than firms); Donald C. Langevoort, Lies
Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Jurisprudence 25 (Georgetown Public Law
Research, Paper No. 12-019, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2010745 (analyzing how “conservative interpretivism” led to the Janus decision).
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sufficient cause for scandal.
Indeed, financial disaster is not even a necessary cause. The junk bond
market still levitated when the federal government went after Michael
Milken. Milken pleaded guilty in April 1989; the junk bond market would
not collapse until October of that year. Milken was targeted because he was
a financial success whose actions entailed negative externalities. Goldman
became a post-financial crisis enforcement target for a similar reason. Each
of the Drexel, Enron, and Goldman enforcement proceedings involved
securities law violations. But the tie that binds them together in the minds
of most people is the perpetrators’ free market arrogance.
This Article has focused on a different tie, the SPE, as manifested in
Bistro and its variants and asset light business planning more generally.
Our account highlights strategic use of corporate alter egos facilitated by
technocratic obfuscation. SPEs are suspicious because no one quite
understands what they are. No one quite understands what they are because
these entities take their form, but not their substance, from existing legal
models. SPEs evolved in practice, and so lack a genesis in a generalized,
planning intelligence, even as transaction engineers have shaped them to
serve their sponsors’ immediate financial goals. An operative theory of the
SPE is emerging, a theory based on economic fundamentals. Even though it
is a theory of the firm, it does not come out of corporate law. It instead
comes from GAAP.
Corporate law is tolerant of alter-ego entities. Historically, these have
been subsidiary corporations.340 So long as a subsidiary maintains its
formal integrity, its liabilities are unlikely to flow through to the parent
company, even though the subsidiary in substance does the parent’s
bidding.341 It is accordingly unsurprising that corporate law has had little to
say about SPEs. Indeed, its formalism makes them possible. It registers no
policy objections: if asset light transactions enhance shareholder value,
boards of directors should pursue them; the evaluation of concomitant risks
is a matter of business judgment. When Enron and the bank SIV sponsors
took the entities’ assets and liabilities back to their balance sheets, it was
not as a result of some corporate law compulsion.
But the convention of respect for formal separation has never applied
340. A related jurisprudence exists in bankruptcy relating substantive consolidation of separate
entities. See In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d at 203–04 (listing the factors an appellate court considers to
decide whether it has jurisdiction over a bankruptcy appeal).
341. See, e.g., Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E. 2d 6, 9 (N.Y. 1966) (finding that formal corporate
separation will generally insulate companies from liability).
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universally. Unsurprisingly, the qualifications tend to come from outside of
corporate law. For example, accountants require consolidation of a
majority-owned subsidiary for financial reporting purposes. Consolidation
does two things: first, the alter ego’s assets and liabilities flow through to
the parent’s statement, and second, contracts between the parent and the
alter ego cannot create profits.
The whole point of an SPE is to create an alter ego that, like a
subsidiary, does the sponsor’s bidding but does so without being deemed
controlled for accounting purposes (and, in the case of a regulated financial
company, without being subject to regulatory capital requirements). The
primary reason, as we have seen again and again, is to facilitate super-high
leverage financing. SPEs proliferated on the theory that super-high
leverage is appropriate for segregated, super-safe assets. An SPE that has
no cognizable equity investment tends to be the entity that best serves this
purpose.
The Bistro structure is the ideal exemplar. Contracts create the SPE,
assign its assets, and govern the terms under which the CDO pays or is
paid. Once the structure is set up, there is nothing for the firm to do. The
deal documents do not, of course, determine the performance of the
reference securities. But that is the whole point. With a synthetic CDO the
messy business of buying and managing risky assets is avoided altogether.
The only risk investors assume is the performance of the reference assets;
operational risk is eliminated.342 It is far better to “reference” the assets,
sell the CLNs, and put the proceeds into Treasury securities, which, among
all the real assets in the world are the ones that have the least risk and
require the least effort to manage. To the extent there are profits, the
contracts in the structure drain them off, while losses are also allocated
contractually by tranching.343 Add it up and the traditional function of
equity is eclipsed. Even when a synthetic CDO like ABACUS employs an
SPE organized as a corporation rather than as a trust, the corporation’s
board of directors is a placeholder dummy and the beneficial interest is
vested in a charitable trust. Form prevails over substance.
The Bistro SPE is a “firm,” but it is a firm in the purest sense of being
nothing more than a nexus of contracts—a credit default swap here and a
note there. It is a pure node of contractual risk allocation. But, unlike prices
on a trading market, contracting nexuses do not coalesce in spontaneous
342.
risk).
343.

See Gelpern & Levitin, supra note 324, at 1078, 1087 (discussing investors’ protections from
Id. at 1121–22 (discussing tranching in SPEs as a type of “contractual bankruptcy”).
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order. They must be created; investors must be solicited. Formal separation
between the sponsor and the entity becomes operative only once the deal
closes. Thus did Goldman get into trouble regarding its formation stage
representations and omissions regarding the content of ABACUS. Until the
notes are sold, there is no ABACUS, only Goldman.
Now compare the SIVs, where the sponsors got into trouble at the
operating stage rather than the formation stage. Where the Bistro structure
carries super-safe to its logical conclusion, filling the SPE with Treasuries,
at the SIVs super-safe meant AAA- and AA-rated assets, but not without
default risk. When an unexpected downside resulted, the sponsors’ regime
of formal separation was wrecked. Because the outside world associated
the SIVs with their bank sponsors, the banks proved unwilling to enforce
their own formal regime. It followed that in substance the SIVs had never
really been separate.344
Now consider the role that contracts played at the SIVs. With Bistro
everything goes on autopilot once the “on” switch is flicked. In contrast,
the SIVs were managed, and management is an equity function under the
traditional legal model of the firm. But once again a controlling equity
interest is incompatible with the SPE business model. The solution was a
management contract with the sponsor that included a performancesensitive fee. The sponsor also took on the junior creditor interest in the
form of a subordinated note that had performance sensitive upside built into
its interest rate. The traditional functions of equity—management control
and residual risk bearing—have been contracted out, but to a sponsor that is
not consolidating the entity for accounting and regulatory capital purposes,
despite controlling it and holding the performance risk.
It is, then, in the nature of a SPE to reallocate the functions of equity
by contract, even as the SPE uses business forms that presuppose and
create an equity interest. Given this profile, the original, non-GAAP “3%
outside equity” rule was profoundly misguided. It presupposed that the
traditional, equity-based theory of the firm determined the SPE’s economic
substance, and then conveniently held that separation could follow from a
minimal dollop of non-sponsor equity capital. The result was Enron’s LJM
transaction. LJM in turn taught the lesson that outside equity cannot solve
344. A similar story emerges for credit card securitizations, which have always been founded on
implicit recourse to the card issuer / securitization sponsor. See Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game:
Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitization, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013),
available at www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=1898763 (discussing card issuer
bailouts of their securitization trusts). Following SFAS 166 and 167, most credit card securitizations
were required to be taken back on balance sheet. Id.
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the SPEs’ separation problem because SPEs are not about outside equity.
To require it for real is to suppress the business model.
The FASB, which as a political proposition is not situated to suppress
trillion dollar business models, figured this out. Its two-step response to
SPEs in FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167345 abandons traditional legal model of
the firm and substitutes a new approach tailored for the SPE. Under the
traditional approach, inter-firm connections follow from equity ownership;
once the tie is established, inter-firm contracts literally drop out for
reporting purposes. In contrast, FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167 look at equity
only at the threshold: if the entity is well-capitalized with equity from
outside, it is independent and there is no issue; if it is not, then contracts
determine the outcome of the inquiry into sponsor separation. Thus, loss
exposure on debt can lead to primary beneficiary status and consolidation.
Control of business decisionmaking and profit sharing through an
investment advisory contract can too. Moreover, determination of the
business model through a controlling document imposed at formation by a
sponsor weighs in the balance.
This is a radical rethinking of inter-firm connectedness and firm
boundaries. The old approach made everything follow from a line of
separation between the equity interest and the interests of contract
counterparties—equity was inside the firm, and contract was outside.
Under the new approach, the line is drawn case by case, based on
allocations of risk and directive power. Significantly, the new approach is
very much compatible with a contractual theory of the firm—the firm as a
“nexus of contracts”—even as it rejects the notion that contract constructs
devised by SPE technicians should determine regulatory results. If the firm
is a collection of different contracts, then an “equity” designation by itself
should not determine substantive inquiries into financial presentation and
risk capital adequacy. The SPEs teach us that residual risk and control can
be allocated any number of different ways, only one of which is formal
equity. The substance of each set of inter-firm relationships needs to be
evaluated individually. Equity ownership may or may not be relevant.
This does not go to say that FIN 46(R) and SFAS 167 solve all SPErelated accounting problems. The SIVs showed that gaming can proceed
even under a new substance over form regime. Decisions as to treatments
continue to be opaque, for only the reporting company and its auditor know
the governing analysis. The outside world gets a look only when things go
wrong.
345.

SFAS 167, supra note 266, at 2.
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But the conceptual barrier has been surmounted. That it took the
Enron scandal and collapse of the SIVs to get us over the barrier is
unsurprising. The balance of power between reporting companies and the
FASB guarantees that standard setting is a reactive proposition. In this
singular, but critical corner of business regulation, scandal has proved a
necessary driver of incentives. It is in this limited sense a cause for
celebration.
In contrast, our look at Goldman, ABACUS, and federal securities
liability regime shows just how embedded superannuated notions of entity
integrity can be. In our view, Goldman and ABACUS should have been
consolidated for securities fraud purposes, with Goldman emerging as the
securities issuer. But we doubt our theory has much traction in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent Janus decision. Taking Janus together with the
formalism of state corporate law, we fear that the legal environment
remains as susceptible as ever to SPE shenanigans so far as concerns
financial accountability.
The SPE is a marvel of modern transaction engineering—a new form
of corporate alter ego, controlled by contract rather than by equity
ownership. The SPE has expanded the boundaries of the operating
companies without law and regulation keeping pace. Only accounting
principles have confronted the challenge of identifying and corralling the
SPE’s abusive aspects. Accounting may be the occasion for fraud, but
when incorporated into securities law, it can be a powerful mandate against
fraud. While accounting treatment is traditionally derivative of legal status,
the law now needs to take its cue from accounting and embrace a more
functional model in which legal duties follow from substantive
relationships rather than contractual forms.

